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The purpose of this research is to examine potential
bargaining strategies and tactics which might be used to
respond to an offer perceived as unfair or unreasonable from
a sole source offeror. Initially, a sole source offeror
normally has considerable bargaining leverage over the
Government. Pricing data needed to properly evaluate the
seller's quotation may be incomplete, inaccurate or
unavailable. Urgent and compelling need may require
accelerating the procurement process.
Using bargaining theory and the classic economic
paradigm of bilateral monopoly as a foundation for the
research, potential bargaining strategies and tactics were
evaluated through a survey of 62 Department of Defense
contracting specialists.
A primary conclusion of the research is that attaining
a bargaining agreement that reflects a fair and reasonable
price under bilateral monopoly conditions is not possible
unless the Government possesses adequate information to
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A central tenet of Government contracting is the
concept of "fair and reasonable" price [Ref . l:p. 1-25] . A
fair and reasonable price must be certified by Government
buyers regardless of the dollar value of the contract,
contract type or method, or urgency of need. A Government
buyer's primary objective is a "total result and price fair
and reasonable to both the Government and the contractor."
[Ref. 2:par. 15.803(c)]
Attainment of a fair and reasonable, or efficient price
is implied when the price reflects the economic forces of a
competitive market [Ref. l:pp. I-29-I-30]. Not all markets
however, are characterized by the condition of many buyers
and sellers that leads to efficient pricing under
competitive market conditions. A market state may more
closely reflect a monopolistic or oligopolistic condition
where it might not be appropriate to infer that a price is
efficient [Ref. 3
:
pp . 371-408] . Major defense contracts for
weapon systems for example, are normally constricted by a
market that consists of only a few defense contractors,
competing in a market where there is one principal buyer,
the United States Government
.
The central question posed by this thesis asks the
question of what bargaining approaches a buyer should
consider when:
a. lack of market forces or competitive pricing for the
product to be procured renders traditional price analysis
methods ineffective, or
b. other conditions lead to an offered price which is
perceived to be unfair or unreasonable and,
c. information needed to ascertain price reasonableness
(e.g., cost or pricing data) is inaccurate, incomplete or
unavailable, and,
d. the item is urgently needed, and
e. there is only one known source of supply.
It is theorized that different bargaining approaches
and strategy may be applied to this type of procurement
dilemma in order to gain information related to the seller's
pricing motives, work to negate the inherent advantages a
sole source seller normally has over a Government buyer,
influence the seller to modify his initial bargaining
position, and ultimately, lead toward the attainment of a
fair and reasonable price.
B . BACKGROUND
The primary goal of this study is to evaluate
bargaining approaches which may be used by Government buyers
to ensure an optimal, or a fair and reasonable price, when a
market condition precludes easy determination of such price.
The Federal Acquisition Regulation requires the price
of all goods and services procured to be "fair and
reasonable" [Ref. 2: par. 15.803]. This rule holds
regardless of the dollar amount of the procurement, the
contract type, procurement method, number of sellers,
national security interests or urgency of need. Assessing
whether a price is fair and reasonable, or "price
reasonableness," is normally accomplished through a
combination of one or more of the several price or cost
analysis methods. There are however, a number of possible
circumstances that may hinder effective price and cost
analysis. The unique nature of certain products and the
lack of a readily defined market may frustrate attempts to
accurately assess a price through price analysis [Ref. 4:pp.
84-89]
. Lack of data concerning the costs of producing and
marketing the product may frustrate accurate cost analysis
[Ref. 4:pp. 46-48] . Lack of time may prevent an accurate
assessment using either price or cost analysis [Ref. 4: pp.
46-48]
. For instance, an item which is urgently required
due to military exigency or other emergency may necessitate
expedited procurement, which may mean completing the
purchase in one day or less. This limited amount of time
may not provide sufficient time for a Government buyer to
correctly assess price reasonableness. Thus, a Government
buyer may face considerable challenges in deciding whether a
price is actually fair and reasonable.
Given that an offered price may not always be fair and
reasonable and urgency of need may create considerable
pressure to purchase the item anyway, the Government
contracting officer faces a potential ethical dilemma: buy
the item and violate a central tenet of Government
contracting which she has sworn to uphold; or delay and wait
until a fair and reasonable price can be obtained or another
alternative to the procurement can be found, even if the
delay may jeopardize national security objectives, human
life or cost many times the price of the item procured [Ref.
4:p. 48] . It is theorized that the application of one or
several bargaining approaches may be effective in resolving
this type of dilemma.
C. SPECIFIC PROBLEM
The following "procurement scenario" was devised to
illustrate the general problem posed in this thesis.
You are a buyer for the Navy working at the Naval
Inventory Control Point (NAVICP) , Philadelphia. You had
received a purchase request from USS CONSTELLATION (CV 64)
for two high pressure steam reducing valves, parts which are
essential for the operation of two of the ship's four steam-
powered catapults. The catapults are currently out of
commission due to lack of these two parts. The purchase
request is stamped C-3 CASREP, meaning that a major
degradation has occurred to a primary weapon system on board
a critical element of the Nation's defense. In fact, the
C-3 status of your requisition is automatic justification at
NAVICP for you to deviate from the normal requirements of
the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) , based on the
"urgent and compelling" nature of the requirement. You
received the requisition yesterday and immediately called
the source of supply, San Diego Valve and Industrial (SDVI),
which quickly responded with an offer of $90,000 for the two
valves required.
You received the technical report a few hours ago. The
report says that the valves were manufactured according to a
design tailored to fit the unique pressure reducing
requirements of the steam catapults and that the original
manufacturer went out of business 20 years ago. Eight of
the valves were originally procured by the Navy, four for
CONSTELLATION and four spares for supply system stock.
Supply stocks were exhausted 10 years ago when all four
valves were requisitioned for a major overhaul of the
catapults. The valve has not been purchased by the
Government since the original valves were purchased thirty
years ago. Purchase price for the original valves was
$1,500 each. The technical report said that SDVI is the
only known source of the valves. The report also concluded,
based on an analysis of the NAVSHIPS drawings for the valve,
that manufacturing the valve, if a manufacturer could be
found, would take a minimum of 16 weeks.
With some suspicion concerning the reasonableness of
the offered price, you called SDVI and requested cost or
pricing data that would allow you to justify the price.
SDVI refused to forward any cost or pricing data, telling
you that it is against their company policy to provide such
data. SDVI also reminded you that their price was below
$100,000, which is the Simplified Acquisition Threshold at
NAVICP. Finally, SDVI told you that their price was
"nonnegotiable . " In short, you were told to "take-it-or-
leave-it." CONSTELLATION is scheduled to depart on a six-
month deployment in three days. You have been told in no
uncertain terms that the ship must have these valves before
getting underway. The Commander of NAVICP, Admiral Flag,
will be briefed daily on the progress of this procurement
.
The following conditions are explicit or implied in
this "procurement scenario"
:
1. There is only one known source of supply.
2 . The price offered is suspected by the buyer as being
extremely unfair and unreasonable.
3. The seller (initially) refuses to provide any
information which might help the buyer assess and validate
the reasonableness and fairness of the price.
4 . The Government holds insufficient cost and pricing
data to determine the reasonableness of the price.
5. The parts are for a critical system on board USS
CONSTELLATION (CV 64) , which will deploy in a matter of
days. "Unusual and compelling urgency" is therefore an
appropriate justification for deviating from normal FAR
procedures
.
6. The chance of finding other parts which might be
suitable substitutes for the parts appears remote, as the
parts were designed specifically for the system on board USS
CONSTELLATION ( CV 64)
.
7. The offered price is below $100,000, precluding the
Government from requiring the contractor to provide cost and
pricing data as a condition for the sale of the parts.
Though this situation may seem unrealistic, the genesis
for evaluating exactly this type of procurement scenario
began when the researcher was faced with just this type of
situation while assigned to a major U.S. Navy ship repair
and maintenance facility. Preliminary research indicated
that other procurement personnel had also faced this type of
procurement dilemma. Jocelyn Higgs in her thesis entitled,
An Examination of Acquisition Ethical Dilemmas : Case
Studies for Ethics Training, related a similar scenario
[Ref . 4 :pp. 87-88] :
A new contracting officer, with less than six
months of experience, receives an urgent
requirement for communication devices needed by a
combat unit deployed overseas . Only one
contractor can meet the specifications and supply
the communication devices. Realizing that the
Government cannot obtain the communication devices
from any other supplier, the contractor pads his
price considerably. The contractor's proposal
includes what the contracting officer thinks is an
exorbitant amount of profit. He consults with
several of his more experienced colleagues in the
contracting office and they confirm that the
profit does represent an 'outrageous' amount of
profit
.
The contractor refuses to provide cost or
pricing data in support of his proposal . In
addition, the contractor objects to several
clauses required by the Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) , including the mandatory audit
clause which grants the Government the right to
"examine and audit - books, records, documents, .
. . and accounting procedures . . . (FAR para.
52.215-2)," to evaluate contractor's costs.
During the contracting officer's preparation
of the contract for award, a senior representative
of the customer - an Army Colonel - calls daily,
demanding that the contracting officer make award
immediately. Because the communication devices
are needed in support of an "unexpected" operation
overseas, the Director of Contracting dismisses
the contracting officer's concerns about the
contractor's price and insists that the
contracting officer sign the contract immediately.
Long after the contract award, the contracting
officer's misgivings about the fairness and
reasonableness of the contractor's price still
cause him to question the rightness of the
decision
.
The type of procurement scenario related in the two
cases just summarized did not escape the attention of many
classical economic theorists, who examined this type of case
in the framework of a bilateral monopoly, or a one buyer,
one seller market [Ref . 5:p. 64] . The insight gathered from
the theoretical perspectives of many of these classical
economists was used to formulate the theoretical foundation
for this thesis.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES
In order to accurately analyze the problems faced by a
Government buyer when offered a seemingly unfair or
unreasonable price in a sole source procurement where
accurate cost or pricing data to assess price reasonableness
are unavailable, the following research questions were
developed
:
1. Primary Research Question:
What bargaining tactics and strategy might be effective
in purchasing goods or services from a sole source offeror
when the price is perceived as unfair or unreasonable?
2. Subsidiary Research Questions:
a) What is a "Fair and Reasonable" price?
b) Are situations similar to the CONSTELLATION scenario
experienced by Government contracting personnel?
c) Are there differences between experienced and
inexperienced contracting personnel with respect to the
elements of bargaining they consider important in cases like
the CONSTELLATION scenario?
d) Are there differences between experienced and
inexperienced personnel with respect to the bargaining
strategy and tactics they would use if confronted with a
procurement situation like the one in the CONSTELLATION?
e) What bargaining approaches are preferred by
Government procurement personnel?
f) Is there any difference between the preferred
bargaining approaches of experienced and inexperienced
contracting personnel?
g) How should Government buyers prepare for bargaining
with a sole source, "take-it-or-leave-it " offeror?
E. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
Analysis was limited to the procurement of goods or
services below the Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT) of
$100,000. The purpose in assigning this limitation was to
assist in examination of the impact that imperfect
information has on the bargaining process. Although the
threshold for requiring certified cost and pricing data is
$500,000 [Ref. 2:par. 15 . 804 -2 (a) (1) ] , a contracting officer
may request information other than certified cost and
pricing data to determine price reasonableness or cost
realism when a contract's total acquisition cost exceeds
$100,000 [Ref. 2:par. 15 . 804 -5 (a) (2 ) ] .
The assumption that a market price, or a price derived
or formed through the actions of a competitive market, is
"fair and reasonable" is implied at points within this
thesis. Lack of a precise definition for the term, "fair
and reasonable" drives this assumption. A "fair price"
implies that the price reflects an equitable division of
trade gains between buyer and seller. "Reasonable" implies
a price which reflects rationality, logic and knowing.
Economic theory tells us that a price derived from a
competitive market is an efficient price, or a price which
optimizes the welfare of market buyers and sellers [Ref. 6:
p. 469] . The author however, was unable to find a
sufficient consensus in economic theory to conclude as
axiomatic that an efficient: price under a competitive market
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condition is equitable, logical and rational, ergo, "fair
and reasonable .
"
Additional analysis of what is a "fair and reasonable"
price is undertaken in Chapter II.
F . METHODOLOGY
An extensive review of microeconomic theory and the
branch of microeconomic theory commonly referred to as
bargaining theory was used to provide a theoretical basis
for this thesis. A significant amount of bargaining theory
is devoted to the economic case of a bilateral monopoly,
which greatly assisted the research effort. The bilateral
monopoly condition can be applied directly to the
procurement scenario drawn by the author to provide a basis
for analyzing the primary and subsidiary research questions.
A survey of Government contracting personnel was also
conducted to ascertain what bargaining tactics and
approaches are currently used in the field and which tactics
and approaches are considered to be most effective. Sixty-
two completed responses were received from a wide variety of
acquisition activities with contracting authority ranging
from under $2,500 (the micro-purchase threshold) to over
$10, 000, 000.
The survey begins by presenting the reader with a
specific framework in which to consider bargaining tactics,
strategy and approaches, the CONSTELLATION procurement
scenario. The scenario presents a framework for extensive
11
analysis from both an economic and a psychological point of
view, because it is a very practical example of a real -world
bilateral monopoly.
Using the CONSTELLATION scenario as a basic point of
reference, each survey participant was asked a series of
questions. The questions were formulated around four
general strategies or goals: (1) to evaluate the frequency
with which scenarios similar to the CONSTELLATION or Higg '
s
scenario occur in the real world, (2) assess the survey
respondents' reaction to a " take-it-or-leave-it " type of
offer and correlate that information to their preferred
bargaining strategies and tactics, (3) gather information on
what Government acquisition specialists viewed as
potentially effective bargaining tactics and strategies to
counter the bargaining advantages the seller holds in the
CONSTELLATION scenario, and (4) gauge whether the survey
respondent's preferred overall approach to bargaining is
interest-based or position based.
G. THESIS ORGANIZATION
Chapter I presented the basic research issues this
thesis will analyze. The issue revolves around what
bargaining strategy and tactics a Government procurement
specialist should consider when faced with an urgent
requirement, a potentially unfair or unreasonable price,
lack of information and an adversarial buyer-seller
relationship. These issues are summarized and analyzed
12
through the CONSTELLATION procurement scenario.
Chapter II will be used to establish a theoretical
framework to view the bargaining scenario. Price theory,
the issue of a "fair and reasonable" price, and the economic
case of a bilateral monopoly, will be used to illustrate the
problem from both the seller and buyer perspectives, as well
as from the combined buyer/seller perspective.
Chapter III will examine the role that bargaining
strategy and tactics play in effecting a bargaining outcome.
Bargaining tactics and strategy are defined, and to further
illustrate the role of bargaining strategy and tactics in
the bargaining process, a general model of bargaining is
presented.
Chapter's IV and V will be used to present and analyze
the data derived from the thesis survey. The primary goal
of these chapters is to analyze what Government contracting
specialists view as potentially effective bargaining tactics
and strategies to counter the bargaining advantages the
seller holds in the CONSTELLATION scenario. Chapter VI of




II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
A . GENERAL
This chapter presents a theoretical foundation for the
subsequent analysis sections of this study. Two major areas
form the locus for this review: microeconomic theory and
bargaining theory. This section has three goals: (1) to
evaluate the pricing options a seller has when pricing his
product, (2) provide insight into the hypothetical
relationship between the buyer and seller as posed in the
survey procurement scenario, and perhaps what is most
important, (3) to define the factors which impact each
party's strategic behavior. An understanding of these
concepts is fundamental to understanding the positions of
the two parties in the scenario and the development of
bargaining approaches which could be used to move the
parties toward an agreement
.
A discussion of pricing theory and pricing approaches
begins this section and is used to illustrate the choices
buyers and sellers must consider when evaluating price. The
concept of "fair and reasonable" as it pertains to price
will be discussed at this point.
Bargaining theory and the strategic aspects of the
bargaining process beneficial to the analysis of the primary
and subsidiary research questions will comprise the latter
portion of this section. Bargaining theorists have often
15
used the microeconomic condition of a bilateral monopoly to
illustrate the strategic interaction of the participants in
a one buyer and one seller market. Unlike the economic
model for a competitive market in which buyers and sellers
maximize welfare through a market pricing mechanism, buyers
and sellers under a bilateral monopoly scenario must
implicitly seek a mutually agreeable price through
bargaining. Thus, the bilateral monopoly case presents an
ideal model for evaluating bargaining theory and the
strategic elements of human interaction that characterize
the bargaining process including "threat, bluff and
strategic behavior in general." [Ref. 7:p. 1]
B. PRICING APPROACHES
A seller may choose a number of different pricing
strategies or approaches, depending on its long and short
term goals and business objectives and the nature of
competition in the market. A primary pricing approach is to
choose a price which will maximize profit [Ref. 3:p. 246] .
Conversely, a seller may price its product below marginal
costs in order to "buy-in" or establish itself in a market.
Along these lines, a firm may discount a profit maximizing
price in order to gain market share, with the goal of
recouping profits later [Ref. l:p. 1-17] . These pricing
strategies and others are surveyed in this section.
Microeconomic theory holds that profit maximization is
a primary motivation for a business interest and thus, a key
16
consideration in determining price [Ref . 8:p. 1] . Under
competitive or market conditions, and absent externalities
which would distort market conditions, profit maximization
occurs at the point where the market demand equals market
supply. In other words, the competitive nature of markets
has the effect of driving the price down to the lowest
possible point at which a rational seller would sell his
product, the point where price just equals the cost of
producing one additional unit, or the marginal cost [Ref.
6:p. 226] . A rational seller would not sell at any point
below this price, since he would incur a loss [Ref. 8: p.
2] .
Under monopoly market conditions, a sole source or
monopoly may discriminate with respect to price [Ref. 6: p.
240] . A profit maximizing price for the monopolist is
attained at the point where marginal revenue equals marginal
costs. Thus, the profit maximizing monopolist will continue
to sell as long as he continues to make a profit. Profit is
not guaranteed in this scenario however, but is dependent on
demand for the product . Total revenue must exceed total
costs for profit to be achieved, which is contingent on the
total quantity sold [Ref. l:p. 1-16].
The market share pricing approach is a strategy in
which the seller prices his product lower than his
competitors in order to gain market share [Ref. l:p. 1-17] .
Alternatively called a "buy-in" pricing approach, this
17
strategy implicitly assumes that the seller is willing to
trade a short term loss in order to penetrate a new market
or to gain customers [Ref . 1: p. 1-17] . By pricing below
the competition, new sellers are potentially dissuaded from
entering the market and current competitors may be driven
from the market, leading to a greater market share for the
seller who uses a market share pricing strategy. As the
quantity produced and sold increases, the seller can expect
average costs to fall, leading to profits in the long run
[Ref. 1 : p. 1-17] .
A market skimming strategy can be successfully applied
by sellers that have a product with a comparative advantage
over the competition [Ref. 1: p. 1-18] . Realizing that some
buyers are willing to pay a premium for the extra advantage
their product provides, the seller prices its product above
the competition, thereby attaining a higher profit margin
than it would attain if it set a price in line with the
competition. Apple Computer Company is a contemporary
example of a firm which was able to successfully use this
approach to sell its "Macintosh" line of computers at a
premium over its competitors [Ref. l:p. 1-18] .
Pricing strategy may also be determined based on
incurred costs [Ref. l:p. 1-8] . Cost-based pricing
strategies include markup pricing, margin on cost pricing
and rate of return pricing [Ref. l:p. 1-8] . In each of
these scenarios, it is producer costs, not market conditions
that guide the pricing strategy [Ref. l:p. 1-8]
.
Markup pricing is a method in which the producer
establishes price as the sum of direct or total costs plus a
desired percentage of cost [Ref. l:p. 1-9] . A producer
using margin on cost pricing establishes price by summing
direct costs or total costs and adding a desired markup
percentage to attain a price. If total costs are used as
the markup benchmark, profit is equal to the markup
percentage multiplied by the quantity sold. Using direct
costs as a benchmark, indirect costs must be subtracted from
mark up percentage and multiplied by the quantity sold in
order to establish profit [Ref. l:p. 1-10] . Rate-of -return
pricing is analogous to margin on cost pricing except that a
desired rate-of -return is substituted for a desired markup
[Ref. l:p. 1-13] .
C. FAIR AND REASONABLE PRICE
Attainment of a fair and reasonable price is a
requirement of all Government contracts [Ref. 2] . When
market conditions set price, or costs are readily available
for review, determining whether a given price is fair and
reasonable is not normally excessively difficult. Defining
what is a fair and reasonable price however, is not always
axiomatic. The subjectiveness of the terms and their
capacity for broad interpretation can lead to disagreement
between a buyer and seller over what is a fair and
reasonable price [Ref. 9:p. 67] . Additionally, a lack of a
19
market-based mechanism for setting price or the availability
of current, accurate and complete cost data can likewise,
lead to difficulty in accurately determining whether a price
is fair and reasonable. Thorough analysis of what is "fair
and reasonable" is necessary in order to resolve the primary
thesis question under consideration.
Attainment of a fair and reasonable price is a
requirement regardless of contracting method or contract
type [Ref . l:pp. I-25-I-34] . The requirement for a fair and
reasonable price holds even under the six cases listed in
FAR Part 6 that allow a contracting officer to deviate from
the FAR requirements for full and open competition [Ref.
2:par. 6.303-2(7)] . Regardless of a lack of competition,
national security, public interest, international agreement
or industrial mobilization, the requirement to develop
engineering or research capability or acquire expert
services, or the presence of an unusual or compelling
urgency, the FAR requires that the "anticipated cost to the
Government (will) be fair and reasonable." [Ref. 2: par.
6.303-2(7)] Lack of cost or pricing data or an objective
yardstick to evaluate what is a fair and reasonable price,
and the universal Government contracting requirement that a
fair and reasonable price be attained regardless of any
exceptional circumstance or exigency, can create significant




The term "fair price" suggests that a fair price should
be equitable, moderate and correct [Ref . 10] . A "reasonable
price" infers that the price achieved should be logical,
rational, sound and wise [Ref. 10] . The FAR does not define
"fair and reasonable." This omission from the FAR implies
either that the definition of the term should be obvious to
the informed reader or that because the term cannot be
defined in objective terms, it cannot be readily or
precisely defined. It is this incongruous aspect of the
term that makes interpretation of the term so tantalizingly
difficult in some circumstances. In practice, it is left to
the knowledge and judgment of a skilled and informed buyer
to decide exactly what is "fair and reasonable." Resolution
of the issue between buyer and seller over what is a fair
and reasonable price is often left to be resolved through
bargaining or negotiation.
The Contract Pricing Reference Guide (CPRG) , which is
prepared jointly by the Air Force Institute of Technology
and Federal Acquisition Institute provides an analysis of
"fair and reasonable." [Ref. l:p. 1-25] A "fair" price is a
price which is fair to both the buyer and the seller. "Fair
to the buyer" is defined as either the [Ref. l:p. 1-26]
. . . fair market value of the contract
deliverable, or the total allowable cost of
providing the contract deliverable that would have
been incurred by a well -managed, responsible firm
using reasonably efficient and economical methods
of performance, plus a reasonable profit.
21
"Fair to the seller" is defined as [Ref. l:p. 1-27]:
. . . a price that is realistic in terms of the
seller's ability to satisfy the terms and
conditions of the contract.
A "reasonable" price is defined as [Ref. l:p. 1-29]
:
. . . a price a prudent and competent buyer would
be willing to pay, given available data on (1)
market conditions, (2) alternatives for meeting
the requirement, (3) the evaluated price of each
alternative, and (4) technical evaluation factors
(in "best value" competitions)
.
Within the definitions of fair and reasonable cited
above, knowledge related to at least one of the following
areas is explicitly required to achieve an acceptable
determination of price fairness and reasonableness: (1)
knowledge of the elements which make up either the costs
incurred in producing the contract deliverable; (2) the
price that would be paid for the product under a given set
of market conditions, or (3) the alternatives for meeting
the requirement. Without such information, the Government
buyer has little to fall back on to ensure the offered price
is fair and reasonable. When such information is held
principally by the seller, it holds considerable pricing
discretion and considerable bargaining power [Ref. 11 :p. 3-
12] .
"Fair and reasonable" is a term which evades a precise
definition. Lack of an objective measuring stick for what
is fair and reasonable and the inherent intangible nature of
the elements that define the term mean that a "fair and
22
reasonable" price determination may not be easily attained
and may be contingent on the interpretation of less than
perfect information. This should not however, lead one to
conclude that they cannot decide that a price is unfair
and/or unreasonable. Within the context of a contractual
agreement, the consensus on what is a fair and reasonable
price is dependent on the buyer's and seller's opinion of
the value of the product or service procured [Ref. 9:pp. 66-
67] . This is the essence of what bargaining is and why it
is theorized that bargaining approaches should be useful in
aiding the determination of what is a fair and reasonable
price
.
D. BARGAINING THEORY AND BILATERAL MONOPOLY
Bargaining holds particular interest to economists
because of the role bargaining plays in the process of
exchange. Considerable study has been devoted to analyzing
the effects of bargaining on the exchange process and the
impact bargaining has on the determination of price [Ref.
12:pp. 103-110] . The economic case of a one-buyer, one-
seller condition, or bilateral monopoly, has particular
interest for bargaining theorists because the high degree of
mutual dependence between the parties and lack of a market
force to set a price implies that bargaining must take place
before an exchange agreement can be reached [Ref. 12 :p.
113] .
A frequently cited example in the literature of a
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bilateral monopoly condition is the case of a unionized
workforce engaged in negotiations with its employer [Ref.
5:p. 1] . Both the union and the firm establish a price for
the good sold, which in this case is labor. The union may
establish for example, that its labor is worth 10 dollars
per hour. The firm, in turn, may establish a value on the
employees' labor of 20 dollars per hour. Any price the
union receives above its reservation price of 10 dollars is
surplus, just as any price the firm receives below its
reservation price of 20 dollars is profit. The net
potential gain in trade between union and firm is 10
dollars. The division of this potential gain in trade, and
the role that bargaining plays in achieving it is however,
the subject of considerable theoretical debate [Ref. 12 :p.
113] .
Despite more than 100 years of analysis by some of the
19th and 20th centuries most noted economists, there remains
considerable disagreement within the literature which
addresses the bilateral monopoly case. The bilateral
monopoly case has been described as a bargaining paradigm by
some, without a determinant quantity or price solution [Ref.
13 :p. 29] . Other theorists have concluded that a
determinate quantity solution is obtainable [Ref. 12 :p.
Ill]
. Still other theorists have found determinant
solutions for both quantity and price. A discussion of the
varied analyses supporting each of these positions is useful
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in illuminating the factors which weigh on the bargaining
process
.
Analysis of the bilateral monopoly case can be traced
back to the work of Edgeworth and his study of the
relationship between trade unions and management [Ref . 5:p.
1] . Of particular interest to Edgeworth was how unions
could affect wages in what was considered to be a perfectly
competitive market [Ref. 5:p. 1] . Edgeworth 's analysis
concluded that the price of labor (wages) was indeterminate
under a bilateral monopoly condition such as a union-
management relationship. A range of equilibrium wages
however, could be constructed using the intersection of the
opposing parties' utility functions to create a "contract
curve." [Ref. 12 :p. 105] The contract curve range was
defined at the lower end of the range by the wage that
management would be forced to pay to maintain an adequate
labor force, and at the upper limit by the maximum wage the
union could demand without creating unacceptable
unemployment [Ref. 5:p. 2]
.
Edgeworth ' s analysis spurred further study. A. L.
Bowley's 1928 analysis of the bilateral monopoly case is
frequently referenced in the literature and is viewed by
many current day economists as the first analysis to provide
a theoretically correct solution to the problem, though
there is some disagreement among theorists over whether
Bowley felt the joint profit maximizing output solution
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should be viewed as a determinant solution [Ref . 12 :p. 108]
.
Bowley presented his theory via three separate cases
involving a monopolistic supplier of iron ore and a
monopsonistic steel producer: Case I, in which the steel
manufacturer could dictate the price of ore, but the steel
producer decided output; Case II, in which the ore supplier
dictated price, but the steel producer determined output,
and Case III, where the ore supplier and steel manufacturer
combined [Ref. 12 :p. 108] . In Cases I and II, Bowley
concluded that the party that established price gained the
larger share of the profits. The stronger party established
the price and was thus a price maker, while the weaker party
was forced to be a price taker, accepting any price so long
as marginal costs (in the case of the monopolist) or
marginal revenues (for the monopsonist) were not exceeded
and the weaker party was allowed to make a profit. Cases I
and II were determined to be socially disadvantageous
however, when compared to Case III, where collusion
occurred, as higher prices and lower outputs result under
Cases I and II [Ref. 12:p. 108]. Under Case III, a
determinate output is attainable at the quantity the
monopolist and monopsonist would produce if the two parties
combined. The output quantity that the colluding parties
would agree to produce is the output which maximizes the
joint profits of the two firms.
Bowley suggested that division of the combined profit
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could possibly be determined at the intersection of the
supplier's offer and producer's demand curves, but concluded
that this position was unstable and unmaintainable because
of the parties' inclination to set their own prices [Ref
.
12 :p. 108] . Thus, a determinate price was not attainable.
A determinate profit maximizing quantity would be maintained
only so long as the two firms colluded.
Zeuthen's theory of bilateral monopoly used Edgeworth's
"contract curve" to create a "range of practicable bargains"
[Ref. 14 :p. 105] . Within this range, any agreement was more
advantageous to the parties than the alternative, which was
non-agreement, or conflict. This conflict was what Zeuthen
termed "economic warfare," or the "complete temporary
discontinuation of all connections with the other party or
threats of such a discontinuation." [Ref. 14 :p. 101]
Zeuthen theorized that the expected costs of the conflict
were measurable and would be compared to the expected
outcome of the conflict in order to determine the "limits of
the fighting sphere," or whether either party might gain an
advantage through fighting [Ref. 14 :p. 105]
.
Zeuthen concluded that while the costs and benefits of
fighting a conflict were determinable, the equilibrium price
was indeterminate, though the price would still fall within
the range of "practicable bargains." [Ref. 14 :p. 106] This
lead Zeuthen to conclude an optimal price under a bilateral
monopoly condition was indeterminate, but that there were
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determining forces that would influence the ultimate price
attained, including "skill at negotiation, changing
sentiments among the rank and file, accidental
circumstances, bluff, etc." [Ref . 14 :p. 106] Ergo,
Zuethen's theory is significant for introducing subjective
bargaining factors into the bilateral monopoly equation,
such as negotiation skill, and its attempt to find "values
and quantities" for these bargaining elements [Ref. 15 :p.
32] .
Zeuthen's theory is also significant for its discussion
of risk in the bargaining process. Pen summarizes Zeuthen's
treatment as follows [Ref. 15 :p. 32]
:
At each step in the bargaining process the
bargainer must compare the possible advantages and
disadvantages. The advantages consist in the
attainment of a more favorable price. The
disadvantages consist in the possibilities of a
conflict. The decisive factors in a bargainer's
choice are not only the magnitude of these
advantages and disadvantages, but also the
bargainer's estimation of their possibility. The
latter designation, (is) designated as the risk of
a conflict ....
Zuethen's analysis of risk succinctly illustrated a
basic concept of bargaining advantage, as well as an
iterative approach of evaluation and reevaluation as a
characterization of the process each party went through to
attain a relative estimation of bargaining advantage. This
approach was later applied by other theorists, notably Jan
Pen, to other subjective elements of bargaining [Ref. 15 :p.
32] .
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Other theorists, building on Zeuthen s work, notably
Schneider, Wicksell and Schumpeter, argued that a
determinate price and stable equilibrium could be attained
in bilateral monopoly, "provided the parties are peaceful
profit maximizers rather than contenders for dominance
resorting to bluff and economic warfare." [Ref . 12 :p. 108]
Profit maximization, when considered a superior strategy to
dominance or economic warfare, was thus viewed as the key
determinant in achieving a stable, determinate price in a
bilateral monopoly condition. In sum, these theorists
argued that profit maximization would not only lead the
bargainers to a range of equilibrium prices as Edgeworth and
Bowley had espoused, but given the assumption that the
parties were "peaceful profit maximizers," a determinate
equilibrium price for the intermediate good traded was
attainable
.
Von Nuemann and Morganstern ' s monumental Theory of
Games and Economic Behavior introduced the game theoretic
approach to bargaining theory [Ref. 16 :p. 155] . Von Nuemann
and Morganstern ascertained a determinate bargaining
solution to the bilateral monopoly case, but found it
necessary to limit their analysis to what they called the
"zero-sum game," or a bargaining scenario in which the
division of profits is "all or none." [Ref. 16 :p. 155]
.
Nash adopted Von Nuemann and Morganstern ' s game theoretic
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approach in his treatise on bilateral monopoly, The
Bargaining Problem [Ref . 16:pp. 155-162] . In The Bargaining
Problem, Nash achieved a definite solution to the bilateral
monopoly condition at the point where each party maximized a
numeric utility that expressed the opportunity that each
party would receive by engaging in bargaining [Ref. 5:p. 7]
.
In Nash's most basic illustration of the theory, this point
is exactly equal to the point on Nash's agreement frontier
at which each party's utility was exactly one half of what
it would be if each party achieved its most desired outcome
[Ref. 5:p. 11] . In order to achieve this optimal solution,
Nash made nine assumptions [Ref. 5
:
pp . 8-10] :
a. The parties are rational and expect the
other to be rational;
b. The parties attempt to maximize their own
utility or gain;
c. Actors have complete information
concerning the utility of alternative settlements
for themselves and their opponents;
d. Neither party will settle for an agreement
that is not Pareto-optimal
;
e. Both parties will bargain in good faith.
That is, once a bargainer makes an offer it cannot
be withdrawn, and once an agreement is reached, it
is enforceable;
f. If the parties' final demands or offers
are incompatible, bargainers get the utility
associated with failure to reach agreement;
g. If the set of possible solutions is
limited to a more restricted range on the
agreement frontier, the determinate solution
remains the same as long as the original solution,
based on the complete agreement frontier, is
included in the more restricted set;
h. The only significant differences between
the parties are reflected in their utility
functions
;
i. An order preserving linear transformation
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of the utilities does not change the solution.
The many assumptions detailed in Nash's approach
illustrated the difficulty in distilling the bilateral
monopoly problem into a realistic set of mathematical
equations which could then be used to formulate a
determinate solution.
Understandably, Nash's assumptions met with some
resistance. Friedman succinctly summed up the limitations
of Nash's approach [Ref. 17 :p. 1] :
Nash gives a unique solution, but does so only by
assuming a symmetrical, and efficient solution,
which in the case of a bilateral monopoly amounts
to assuming the answer.
Pen's A General Theory of Bargaining openly criticized
bargaining theory which espoused assumptions which would
simplify or inhibit the conduct and knowledge of the
bargaining parties [Ref. 15:pp. 24-26] . He singularly
pointed out the assumptions of "rational conduct, neutral
risk valuation and perfect insights" made under the Nuemann-
Morganstern approach as "too specific, " and similarly
criticized Nash's supposition of equal bargaining skill
[Ref. 15:p. 25]
.
Pen's critical view fell equally on those theories of
bilateral monopoly which ignored the subjective elements of
the bargaining process [Ref. 15 :p. 25] . He argued that
Bowley's theory (and the complimentary work of Henderson,
Marshall and Stackleberg, among others) , failed to find a
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determinate price solution because the theory failed to
elucidate the relationship between the price and
psychological factors, which Pen termed in the singular as
"datum" [Ref . 15 :p. 24] . Pen describes "datum" in the
following terms [Ref. 15 :p. 27] :
Because all social phenomena are to a certain
degree interdependent, all phenomena are,
intrinsically, determining factors in the outcome
of the bargaining process. Somewhere in the
causal chain, we have to place a limit to our
investigation. The first factor at the other side
of the limit is called a datum.
Pen's primary data for constructing his theory of
bargaining were what he called a bargainer's ophelimity
functions , or the satisfaction that a bargainer achieved
through the attainment of a certain price [Ref. 15:pp. 24-
26] . In the simplest case, Pen's ophelimity function
corresponded to a buyer or seller's profit function. Aside
from profit, psychological factors might also contribute to
a bargainer's ophelimity function [Ref. 15 :p. 28]
:
The attaining of a certain result may have a
certain value in itself, just as the hunter who
shoots a rabbit will derive a certain satisfaction
from it, quite apart from the expected pleasure of
his dinner .... Sometimes it is apparent in a
negative sense, especially when the bargainer is
forced away from a price he has heavily insisted
upon, and he fears to "lose face. ' In this case
the ophelimity function may show a sharp peak at
the price which was claimed before.
Pen's ophelimity functions were thus, multidimensional
and possessed the capability for accounting for a complete
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range of objective and psychological or subjective
bargaining elements. Elasticity of demand for labor for
example, was only one of many factors to consider in
determining a union leader's ophelimity function [Ref . 15 :p.
28] . Other factors, such as the union member's preference
for a particular wage and the leader's perceived loss of
member confidence should he fail to realize a satisfactory
wage rate, might also be factored into the function [Ref.
15 :p. 28] . Pen concluded by stating that ophelimity
functions could be formulated to reflect all factors that
determine a bargainer's preference for a certain bargaining
outcome [Ref. 15:p. 29].
Pen's theory was also significant for its illumination
of the concept of bargaining power. Pen describes
bargaining power in the following terms [Ref. 15 :p. 40]
:
Given the ophelimity functions (expressing
the opposed wills of the bargainers) , economic
bargaining power depends on conflict ophelimities,
the risk valuation functions, and on the capacity
of the parties to shift these determinants.
Pen's theory thus provided a framework for defining and
evaluating bargaining power, based on the subjective and
objective elements which made up the bargainer's ophelimity
functions, each party's particular and relative perception
of conflict and risk, and on the capacity of the parties to




A principal purpose of Bacharach and Lawler's general
theory of bargaining was to analyze the determinants and
consequences of bargaining power and describe the connection
between bargaining power and bargaining tactics [Ref. 5:p.
x] . Within this framework, bargaining power was viewed as a
"primary framework" or "schemata of interpretation" for the
bargaining process [Ref. 5:p. 43] . For Bacharach and
Lawler, bargaining power was the "essence of bargaining" and
the [Ref. 5:p. 43]
:
. . . pivotal construct for a general theory of
bargaining .... Bargaining power pervades all
aspects of bargaining and is the key to an
integrative analysis of context, process and
outcome
.
Bargaining power is further described as a "sensitizing
concept or primitive term." [Ref. 5:p. 44] That is,
bargaining power cannot be defined precisely, but "points to
a series or range of phenomena but not in a manner that
allows precise definition or measurement." [Ref. 5:p. 44]
Thus, bargaining power is viewed as "tactical and subjective
in nature." [Ref. 5:p. xi]
.
Bacharach and Lawler's theory is important for the
emphasis it places on the relationship between bargaining
power and tactics. Tactics are viewed as the "intervening
link between potential power and bargaining outcomes." [Ref.
5:p. 47] "Bargaining tactics are designed to manipulate
equalities or inequalities in power and thereby produce an
agreement favorable to one's own interests." [Ref. 5:p. 179]
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Bacharach and Lawler's general theory of bargaining
offers a dependence approach., or what they subsequently
define as "dependence theory" as a concept for analyzing
bargaining power [Ref . 5:p. 59]
:
On the most general level, dependence refers
to the degree that parties have a stake in the
bargaining relationship. High stakes indicate
that bargainers attribute considerable importance
to maintaining the bargaining relationship. The
comparative and mutual stakes of bargaining
parties are essentially grounded in the resource
context .... A theory of bargaining therefore,
must provide a framework that grasps the essential
components or variables of the dependence
relationship and also relates this ambiguous
context to tactical action at the bargaining
table
.
Bacharach and Lawler's theory concludes by drawing
three general propositions that relate dependence and
bargaining power [Ref. 5:p. 209] :
(1) An increase in the dependence of Party A
on Party B increases B ' s absolute bargaining
power
(2) An increase in the ratio of A's
dependence on B to B's dependence on A, increases
B's relative bargaining power.
(3) An increase in the sum of A's and B's
dependence increases the total bargaining power in
the relationship.
Three additional hypotheses are formulated based on
these propositions [Ref. 5:p. 209] :
(1) A decrease in A's alternative outcome
sources or an increase in A's commitment to the
outcomes at issue increases B's absolute
bargaining power.
(2) An increase in the ratio of A's
alternatives or commitment to B ' s alternatives or
commitment increases B's relative bargaining
power
.
(3) An increase in the sum of both parties'
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dependence along the alternatives and commitment
dimensions increases the total bargaining power in
the relationship.
Blair, Kaiserman and Romano's analysis of the bilateral
monopoly case, including a review of 28 microeconomic texts
which treat the subject of bilateral monopoly, affirmed
Bowley's analysis as theoretically correct while using
Bowley's framework to support the conclusion that the joint
profit maximizing intermediate quantity solution is also
correct [Ref. 18 :p. 831] . Their basic analysis operated
under three assumptions: (1) price/quantity negotiations
must be held before an agreement can be reached (2) output
quantity must be specifically addressed during the
negotiations, and (3) joint profit maximization was an
incentive for the parties [Ref. 18 :p. 839] . Blair,
Kaiserman and Romano's analysis used iso-profit curves to
define the limits and the shape of the contract curve. The
contract curve was shown to be comprised of the points of
tangency between the seller and buyer's iso-profit curves
[Ref. 18 :p. 838] . In this manner, the researchers
demonstrated that the contract curve was a vertical line
which spanned a range of prices at the point where the joint
profit maximizing quantity was produced [Ref. 18 :p. 839]
.
Blair, Kaiserman and Romano also addressed the issues
surrounding the determinateness of the price of the
intermediate good. The trio concluded that the price of the
intermediate good would be determined through bargaining,
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just as the quantity was determined [Ref 18 :p. 835] . Though
they appear to favor a determinant price solution, their
analysis does not attempt to present such a solution, though
the authors do suggest that a game theoretic approach may be
helpful [Ref. 18 :p. 839] . The authors qualify this aspect
of their analysis by stating that a credible take-it-or-
leave-it offer would lead to a determinate price. "If one
of the bilateral monopolists could make a credible
commitment to withdraw from the market in the event of a
breakdown and make a single take-it-or-leave-it offer on the
contract curve, then the contract curve becomes infinitely
short." [Ref. 18 :p. 839] The weaker party to the
negotiation would act as a competitive firm and would accept
any price offered that would return a profit, since the
alternative would be no profits [Ref. 18 :p. 839] . This
aspect of the analysis is analogous to Bowley's Case I or
Case II approach: one party dominates the negotiation
relationship in each of these cases, forcing the weaker
party to acquiesce to the terms of the dominant party. Any
other alternative would lead to a negotiation breakdown and
to zero profits.
Empirical studies accomplished by Siegel and Fouraker
in the 1960's supported the assertion of a determinate
quantity, but an indeterminate price under bilateral
monopoly [Ref. 19 :p. 69] . Using data compiled through a
series of experiments featuring mock negotiations within a
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number of different bilateral monopoly scenarios, the
researchers concluded "that there is a clear tendency for
bargainers under simulated bilateral monopoly situations to
negotiate contracts at that quantity which maximizes the
joint payof f . " [Ref . 20, p. 36] The researchers also
concluded however, "that traditional economic forces cannot
be depended on to yield an adequate explanation of the
prices arrived at in bilateral monopoly bargaining." [Ref.
19 :p. 69] The "personal characteristics" of the bargainers
are proposed as the primary determinant of the joint and
individual payoffs to each of the parties [Ref. 19:p.69]
.
The two researchers identify information as a
significant bargaining element in the context of bargaining
under a bilateral monopoly scenario. There assertions are
summarized below [Ref. 20 :p. 36]
:
1. There is tendency for bargainers to negotiate
contracts which are Pareto optimal
.
2. Increasing the amount of relevant information
available to bargainers strengthens the tendency
toward Pareto optimal agreements.
3
.
Increasing the amount of information available
to the bargainers tends to lead to a more equal
division of the joint pay-off.
4 Supplementing the higher payoffs to only one
player so as to increase the utility to him of
these outcomes tends to increase his payoff at
agreement
.
5. If both bargainers have complete information,
they tend to be more modest in their initial
demands than they are in cases of incomplete
information
.
6. Occasionally when an opponent offered an
unexpectedly generous bid .... The subject's
usual reaction was to raise his own payoff
request
.
7 There is some evidence that increasing the
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information to one player alone tends to decrease
his payoff at agreement.
Siegel and Fouraker go on to derive a general model of
bargaining wherein a bargaining party's aspirations are
determined as a function of the party's minimum and maximum
payoff expectancy, a party's rate of concession and ability
to perceive his opponent's concession rate, and the duration
of the negotiations.
Siegel and Fouraker' s empirical work was thus important
for identifying key elements important to the specific case
of a bilateral monopoly and for bargaining theory in
general. The personal characteristics of the bargainers,
the information available to the bargainers, the bargainer's
aspirations, time, each bargainer's rate of concession and
each bargainer's ability to perceive his opponent's
concession rate all play a role in Siegel and Fouraker '
s
model . This information thus adds valuable insight into
understanding the bargaining process, the behavior of the
bargaining participants and the resulting prices under a
bilateral monopoly condition.
Machlup and Tabor state, "One point on which nearly all
economists of the twentieth century have agreed concerns the
indeterminateness-in pure theory-of the division of profits
between the two parties in a bilateral monopoly." [Ref . 12:
p. 112] This position is not universally held however.
Nash's analysis supported a determinant price solution as
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did the earlier works of Schumpeter, Schneider and Wicksell.
The researcher found two analyses completed after Machlup
and Tabor's work that offer a determinant price solution for
the intermediate good traded. It is interesting to note
that these analyses assumed either perfect information, or
at a minimum, that buyer and seller knew each other's
respective marginal cost and marginal revenue functions, and
bargained accordingly. These analyses are briefly
summarized in the following paragraphs.
Truett and Truett ' s analysis argued that a determinant
price is possible, given the assumption that the seller
knows the demand function of the buyer and buyer knows the
marginal cost function of the seller [Ref . 21:pp. 260-270]
.
Their analysis suggested that if one party was receiving
less than its equilibrium share of the profits, that party
would balk, break its contract with the other party, slow up
orders, reject merchandise as being defective, or use some
type of ploy in order to obtain a fairer share of the
profits, thus leading the parties toward an equilibrium
price [Ref. 21 :p. 265] . It is however, implicit in their
analysis that the party receiving less than its fair share
of the profits knows it is getting the short end of the
bargain. The authors admit as much when they conclude that
one party, "might be willing to act as a price taker ....
(1) when coercive action is undertaken by the other or (2)
when information is incomplete." [Ref. 21 :p. 265]
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Information requirements are also mandated in Dobbs and
Hill's solution to bilateral monopoly pricing. Dobbs and
Hill suggested a non-uniform pricing schedule might be used
to move the parties towards an optimal solution [Ref. 22:
p. 480] . However, even under the uncertainty case proposed
by these authors, it is assumed that both parties know the
supplier's cost function as well as the structure of the
demand, or marginal revenue curve of the buyer [Ref. 22 :p.
482]
.
Knowledge of a seller's costs and buyer's revenue
functions was thus a prerequisite for attaining a
determinant price under Dobbs and Hill's analysis.
E . SUMMARY
This section considered the theoretical question of
price determination from three separate perspectives: (1)
the seller's perspective, (2) the Government buyer's
perspective and (3) the combined perspective as seen through
the process of bargaining.
A seller might consider a number of possible pricing
approaches. Which approach works best for the seller
depends on market conditions, the profit and market share
goals of the seller, the ability of the seller to
discriminate with respect to price and the certainty with
which a seller can ascertain costs.
Understanding what pricing strategies a seller might
use given a particular market setting is critical for a
Government buyer [Ref. 23 :p. 9] . Each pricing approach and
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each element within a pricing approach lends itself to the
process of price analysis and answering the pivotal question
of whether the price offered is fair and reasonable.
Fair and reasonable cannot be precisely defined. We
can normally safely assume that if a price is derived from
the forces of a competitive market, then the price is fair
and reasonable. However, not all markets reflect sufficient
competition to be able to assume a price is fair and
reasonable, and even competitive markets are subject to
externalities or other market aberrations which can distort
efficient pricing.
The impact that bargaining has on price made up the
tertiary portion of this section. An overview of
significant bargaining theory was developed in order to
contrast the viewpoints of bargaining theorists over the
last 100 years. The case of a bilateral monopoly was
implicit or explicit in much of this work, and since the
primary and subsidiary research questions are built on a
bilateral monopoly scenario, this case was emphasized.
There still exists some confusion over the correct
solution to the bilateral monopoly case [Ref . 18 :p. 831]
.
The solution which has engendered the most acceptance is the
solution of a determinant quantity, indeterminant price
based on Bowley's analysis [Ref: 12 :p. Ill]
.
Other theorists argue the position that both price and




I2:p. 108], subsequently Nash [Ref 16:p.
155], and more recently Truett and Truett [Ref. 21:p.260]
and Dobbs and Hill [Ref. 22 :p. 479-489] all argue that a
determinant price is possible, given certain assumptions.
Schneider, Wicksell and Schumpeter concluded that peaceful
profit maximizer's would share the profits equally. Nash's
game theoretic solution concluded that the bilateral
monopolists would share equally in the joint profits.
Truett and Truett ' s analysis suggested a seller or buyer who
knew or had information it could obtain a greater share of
the profits would resort to ploys or tactics which would
incentivize the other party to offer a more equal share of
the profits, thus leading the parties toward an equilibrium
price. Information was also a necessary requirement in
Dobbs and Hill's solution to bilateral monopoly pricing.
Both parties were assumed to know the supplier's cost
function as well as the structure of the demand, or marginal
revenue curve [Ref. 22 :p. 482] . The assumption that each
party had correct information with respect to the other's
cost or revenue functions was thus a common thread linking
all analyses which offer a determinant price solution.
Bargaining theorists are therefore divided over the
impact that the bargaining process has on determining price
and achieving a bargaining agreement under bilateral
monopoly. One order of theorists, including Nash,
Schumpeter, Schneider and Wicksell, tend to see bargaining
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as a passive means for moving the two opposing parties
toward a determinate equilibrium price that optimized the
benefits each party receives in exchange. Information
concerning the seller's and buyer's cost and revenue
functions allow the amount of profits available to be
determined by both parties, leading the parties toward an
equilibrium solution.
Another order of theorists, including Zuethen, Pen,
Bacharach and Lawler, and Siegel and Fouraker, saw the
bargaining process as more dynamic, while dismissing the
assumptions about information used by those who support the
notion of a determinant price. These theorists emphasized
the impact that the behavioral and psychological aspects of
bargaining have on the bargaining process, including the
need for information, the parties' expectations and
aspirations, each party's commitment, their perception of





The principal question of this research asks what
bargaining tactics and strategy a Government buyer might use
to effectively purchase goods or services from a sole source
offeror when the price is perceived to be unfair or
unreasonable. It is hypothesized that a Government buyer
should be able to effect a "better bargain" through the use
of bargaining tactics and strategy. The principal question
then, is a question of strategic behavior. What makes one
bargaining tactic effective and another bargaining tactic
ineffective? How does one evaluate what is a "good"
bargaining tactic and what is a "bad" bargaining tactic?
What bargaining elements should one consider when
formulating a specific bargaining strategy or tactic? And,
what role does the market setting, such as the setting
provided in the "procurement scenario, " a Government
-
contractor bilateral monopoly, play in determining
bargaining tactics?
These questions defy the formulation of an easy answer.
They are as fundamentally difficult to answer as is the
formulation of a determinate price solution for the economic
condition of bilateral monopoly. Why should this be so? In
short, it is because strategic behavior presents an almost
unlimited array of determinants, choices and approaches. In
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bargaining, this is reflected in the interaction of various
bargaining elements, the relative importance of each element
to the bargaining parties, and the possibility that the
values the parties hold for any particular bargaining
element may change as a result of the bargaining process
[Ref . 5:p. 47] . Friedman sums up the problem with strategic






The analysis of strategic behavior is an
extraordinarily difficult problem. John Von
Neumann, arguably one of the smartest men of this
century, created a whole new branch of mathematics
in the process of failing to solve it. The work
of his successors, while often ingenious and
mathematically sophisticated, has not brought us
much closer to being able to say what people will
or should do in such situations.
Following this line of reasoning, this chapter will not
attempt to formulate an answer to the questions at hand by
proposing that an optimum bargaining tactic or range of
bargaining tactics can be realized through analysis. A
comprehensive review and analysis of bargaining tactics and
strategy is therefore not necessary or desirable. It is not
the intent of this chapter to make the reader an expert in
the application of bargaining tactics for a given
procurement scenario. Rather, the focus of this chapter is
to establish a framework for formulating and understanding
bargaining tactics and for interpreting bargaining behavior.
To accomplish this end, a general model of bargaining is
presented for the purpose of illuminating the key factors
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which may affect the bargaining process, including the
initial bargaining position, bargaining power, bargaining
tactics and bargaining outcomes.
B. BARGAINING TACTICS AND STRATEGY
Bargaining tactics receive considerable attention in
the literature of negotiation and bargaining. A large
number of complementary definitions are available in the
literature. Bargaining tactics may be defined as a
"particular action deliberately committed or omitted to
support a predetermined strategy." [Ref. 24 :p. 7] Expressed
in a similar manner, "tactics are the tools used to
implement strategies." [Ref. 25:p. 14] Tactics may also be
viewed as the "vehicle through which bargaining parties
attempt to maximize gains and minimize losses." [Ref. 5:p.
ix]
.
Warshaw describes tactics as [Ref. 26:p. 119],
. . . a series of steps in pursuit of an
objective. No single tactic is expected to carry
the day. Rather, each tactic is designed to make
a specific contribution toward the ultimate goal.
Alternatively, a bargaining tactic may be described as an
approach, maneuver, strategy, stratagem, ploy, scheme or
plan
.
Bargaining tactics are much more frequently described
in terms of what the tactics are intended to do, rather than
defined, the former being easier to accomplish while
providing a better illustration of what the tactic is
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designed to do. A series of different bargaining tactics
were proposed as a method for resolving the dilemma posed in
the thesis procurement scenario. As part of this research,
62 Department of Defense procurement specialists were
queried on what bargaining tactics they have used or would
use in the future to resolve the procurement scenario
dilemma. The following bargaining tactics, taken from
Chester Karrass' book, Give and Take, the Complete Guide to
Negotiating Strategies and Tactics [Ref. 9], were offered in
the survey:
(1) Appeal to seller's patriotism.
(2) Implicitly notify the seller that future Government
business for his firm may be sharply curtailed unless he
bargains in good faith.
(3) Tell the seller in no uncertain terms that future
Government business for his firm may be sharply curtailed
unless he bargains in good faith.
(4) Tell the seller that you need his help in order to
determine that the offered price is fair and reasonable.
(5) Threaten to bypass the seller's representative you
are dealing with and appeal for a fair and reasonable price
from his boss.
(6) Use probing questions (e.g., How did the seller
arrive at the price he is asking for the part) in order to
test the firmness of the seller's position.
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(7) Inform the seller of possible alternatives to
buying the part from the seller (e.g., possibly repairing
the valve)
.
(8) Lie to the seller by informing him that you have
another source of supply.
(9) Tell the seller that you plan to bring in higher
management to assist you.
(10) Make a low ball counteroffer.
(11) Make a counteroffer explaining the amount offered
is all you have.
(12) Explain that the seller's price is much higher
than what you expect the part should cost and ask for a cost
breakdown
.
(13) "Walk away" from the seller's offer, with the hope
that you can resume bargaining on better terms later on.
(14) Offer the sole source a letter contract.
(15) Tell the seller, "You have got to do better than
that !
"
(16) Tell the seller that a new design for the part you
wish to buy from him is "In the works."
(17) Tell the seller that his position has angered your
boss .
(18) Patiently wait for the seller to offer a better
deal .
The tactics cited above can be viewed as potential
tools for any number of potential bargaining strategies.
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What matters in the present however, is how these tactics
may be applied to the dilemma posed in the procurement
scenario. Within the model approach that will be presented
in the next section, bargaining tactics such as those
offered in the survey may be applied towards three broad
strategies: (1) acquiring, interpreting and applying
information with respect to each party' s determinants of
bargaining power; (2) expressing bargaining power, either
real, implied or potential; and, (3) the application of
bargaining power towards a bargaining outcome.
While the term, "bargaining strategy" is frequently
interchanged with the term, "bargaining tactic, " the general
consensus within the literature treats a tactic or tactics
as a subset of a bargaining strategy. Thus, a bargaining
strategy is normally viewed as a plan of action used to
achieve a goal [Ref. 27:p. 10].
As with tactics, describing bargaining strategies is a
more illuminative method of illustration than is an attempt
to define a particular bargaining strategy. The number of
potential bargaining strategies a Government contracting
specialist may make use of is extremely large; one study of
Government contract negotiators offered the following ten
strategies [Ref. 27:p. 57]
:
(1) COMBINATION (THE "BIG POT") : Introducing many
issues at one time, using "throw-away" points to
50
get major concessions.
(2) COVERAGE ("BOTTOM-LINING") : Negotiating on
total cost/price basis versus item-by-item.
(3) DEFINITE ACTION ("TESTING THE WATERS") : Taking
a definite position forcing the opposition to
either accept or reject your position.
(4) LIMITS: Using authority, time, budget, or
other limits to pressure concessions from the
opposition
.
(5) PARTICIPATION/INVOLVEMENT: Designing the team
composition to narrow or broaden the areas of
negotiation (use of experts for example)
.
(6) PATIENCE ("BUYING TIME OR STALLING") : Using
delay TACTICS to prolong consideration of an issue
or to counter a time limit strategy.
(7) SURPRISE: Any unexpected action to gain
acceptance of a point or obtain concessions from
the opposition.
(8) REVERSAL ("THE LESSER OF TWO EVILS")
:
Presenting increasingly more rigid demands forcing
the opposition to accept a lesser (preceding or
following) offer - your true objective.
(9) STATISTICS ("FIGURES DON'T LIE"): Using
learning curves, trend analysis, or historical
records as the primary support for your position.
(10) STEP-BY-STEP: Presenting a series of
acceptable minor points to obtain a major
concession: also used to counter "The Bottom Line"
strategy
.
Why the author referenced here selected these ten
particular strategies to formulate and conduct his research
is not addressed within his research. It is known, that
the same ten strategies were used in a similar research
project and therefore these strategies may have been chosen
in order to be able to compare the studies. They are
mentioned here to illustrate to the reader a range of
possible strategies a Government contracting specialist
might use in a given procurement.
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Robert P. Johnston suggested three strategies are
common to a negotiation: competitive, collaborative, and
subordinative [Ref. 28:p. 156]. Competitive was described
as a "We-They" or "Win-Lose" approach, and was characterized
by low levels of trust between the negotiating parties,
unpredictability, the use of threat and bluff, and potential
use of irrational arguments to support a party's position
and commitment [Ref. 28:p. 158-159]. Collaborative strategy
had a goal of "Win-Win" in which both parties pursued a
strategy which reflected common goals, trust, openness and
mutually satisfying solutions [Ref. 28:p. 158-159]. Active
listening, jointly exploring alternatives, and the
development of constructive relationships were
characteristics of this strategy [Ref 28:p. 158-159].
Subordinative negotiation strategy was characterized by
potentially self-defeating "Win-Lose" behavior, wherein one
party gave up position in order to meet the needs of the
other party [Ref p. 158-159]. "Concern with harmony results
with total avoidance of conflict," effectively turning the
subordinate party into a "doormat" for the stronger party
[Ref .28:p. 158-159]
.
A remarkable discussion of strategy and one which
provides a marked contrast to the strategies previously






Sun Tzu in his chapter titled Offensive
Strategy, offers five strategies for ensuring victory in
battle [Ref. 29:pp. 82-83]:
(1) He who knows when he can fight and when
he cannot will be victorious.
(2) He who understands how to use both large
and small forces will be victorious.
(3) He whose ranks are united in purpose will
be victorious
.
(4) He who is prudent and lies in wait for an
enemy who is not, will be victorious.
(5) He whose generals are able and not
interfered with by the sovereign will be
victorious
.
Those with bargaining and negotiating experience may
readily associate Sun Tzu' s strategies with similar
purchasing strategies or approaches. The statement, "He who
is prudent and lies in wait for an enemy who is not, will be
victorious," suggests that a strategy that emphasizes
patience will be successful. Analogously, the statement,
"He whose ranks are united in purpose will be victorious,"
suggests that commitment is an important element to consider
when formulating strategy. Consider as well the strategy
reflected in Sun Tzu' s statement that, "He whose generals
are able and not interfered with by the sovereign will be
victorious." This statement brings to mind the unfair price
case discussed by Higgs (Ref. 4), wherein an Army Colonel
used a pressure tactic in an attempt to influence the
decision of a contracting officer who balked at buying
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communications equipment at a price which he felt was unfair
and unreasonable. Whether or not the Colonel's interference
in the Higg' s case was a determining factor in the
contracting officer' s decision, or if the contracting
officer's decision in that case was right or wrong, it is
remarkable that Sun Tzu's 2,500 year old thesis on war and
strategy can be applied to current day contracting
scenarios, such as the ethics dilemma proposed by Higgs.
C. A MODEL APPROACH TO BARGAINING POWER
A significant body of bargaining theorists, including
Pen, Zeuthen, Bacharach and Lawler, Friedman, etc., hold
that there are factors or elements beyond those which can be
stated in purely economic terms that can affect the
bargaining process and influence the bargaining outcome.
These elements include bargaining skill, the degree of
dependence between the bargaining parties, the parties'
perception of risk, time and aspirations. To define these
bargaining elements and provide a framework for
understanding how these elements affect the bargaining
process, the researcher developed a general model of
bargaining designated, A Model for the Determinants of
Bargaining Power and Bargaining Outcomes .
The primary purpose of the model is to provide a
framework for understanding potential bargaining tactics in
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a general bargaining environment and for understanding the
context of bargaining within the CONSTELLATION procurement
scenario. What bargaining tactics could a Government
contract specialist consider in the circumstance related in
the CONSTELLATION procurement scenario, to counter an
initial unfair or unreasonable offer from a sole source
offeror? A few examples of possible tactics are threatening
to curtail future business with the vendor, suggesting that
another source of supply might be available, appealing to
the vendor's patriotism, and appealing to the vendor's
superior. Which approach should one use, or attempt to use?
Each of these tactics has a motive or purpose and
understanding the situational elements or dispute
characteristics that exist in the CONSTELLATION procurement
scenario and are common to many bargaining scenarios, may
help answer this question. It may be helpful for instance,
to consider the interests of the parties, the relationship
between the buyer and seller, the commitment of the parties,
possible alternatives, time constraints and each party's
perception of risk. These elements are key factors for
formulating bargaining tactics in the Model for the
Determinants of Bargaining Power and Bargaining Outcomes
.
The Model for the Determinants of Bargaining Power and
Bargaining Outcomes is a synthesis of the six types of
bargaining power described by Ralph Liebhaber in the
55
Contract Pricing Reference Guide, Volume V [Ref. 11], and
the seven elements of conflict espoused by Fisher, Kopelmann
and Schneider in Beyond Machiavelli , Tools for Coping with
Conflict [Ref. 30] . Seven primary elements of bargaining
are proposed as determinants of bargaining power and form a
foundation for the model: information, alternatives,
bargaining skill, the buyer and seller relationship, time,
interests and risk.
Bacharach and Lawler's general theory of bargaining
complements the model by providing a ready definition for
the role that bargaining tactics play with respect to the
acquisition of bargaining information, bargaining power and
the relationship between bargaining power and the bargaining
outcome in the model [Ref. 5: p. 46] . The model is
illustrated in Figure 1.
The model embraces Bacharach and Lawler's approach to
bargaining as a "dynamic interplay between power and
tactics." [Ref. 5: p. 40] Tactics within the model play
three critical roles: (1) tactics are the vehicle through
which information is solicited, interpreted and applied; (2)
tactics are the means of expressing bargaining power: real,
implied or potential; and (3) tactics are the means of
applying bargaining power towards the attainment of a

























































Bargaining power forms the "pivotal construct" within the
model, as exemplified in Bacharach and Lawler's approach
[Ref . 5: p. 47] , with tactics acting as links between the
determinants of bargaining power, the realization of
bargaining power and ultimately, the bargaining outcome
[Ref. 5: p. 47] . Bargaining power within the model is
viewed in close consonance with Pen's definition of economic
power [Ref. 15: p. 30]
:
Economics is the science of scarcity;
scarcity gives rise to the dependence of the
subject on certain quantities of goods. If these
goods are in the hands of a seller who cannot be
perfectly substituted by another seller, the buyer
becomes dependent on the seller. The seller can
exercise economic power by threatening to withhold
the goods, that is to say, he is able to make the
subject do things he would not have done
otherwise. So economic power is controlled by two
conditions: first, the dependence of the buyer
who is to be subordinated to the seller; and
second, a possibility for the supplier to withhold
his offer, or more precisely, the buyer's belief
right or wrong, that this possibility exists.
Thus, dependence in the buyer- seller relationship is a
necessary precursor of bargaining power.
Realization of each party's bargaining strengths and
weaknesses is essential to maximizing bargaining power [Ref
.
11: p. 3-12] . Information thus forms the overarching, or
central bargaining determinant within the model, linking the
other primary bargaining determinants. Information leads
directly to knowledge of the other party's bargaining
alternatives, bargaining skills, interests, perception of
risk, valuation of time and the relationship between the two
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parties. Assessing the strengths and weaknesses that the
other party holds for these elements through fact-finding
and preparation forms a foundation for building a bargaining
advantage and a basis for formulating bargaining tactics and
strategy. In essence, information translates directly into
bargaining power.
Alternatives are the options each bargaining party has
to bargaining [Ref . 30: p. 77] . Alternatives may include
walking away from the deal, seeking or attaining the product
or service sought from another source, or purchasing a
suitable substitute item.
The element of time as a model element can be defined
as a measurement of the cost of waiting to conclude the
bargaining agreement [Ref. 11: p. 3-13] . Patience,
persistence, urgency and endurance are model sub-elements
which are defined within the model as a function of time.
The relationship between bargaining parties describes
the parties' associations, linkages and commonalities [Ref.
30: p. 78] . The relationship is the assimilation of the
bargaining parties' shared perceptions. Relationships may
be founded on prior business dealings or formulated in the
present. Trust, credibility, legitimacy, and reputation,
are sub-elements of the bargaining relationship. The level
of congruence, or similarity, functions as a measurement of
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the level of cooperation within the bargaining relationship .
Interests are defined within the model as the
requirements or needs of the prospective parties with
respect to the proposed bargain [Ref . 30: p. 74] . Price,
cost, schedule or performance objectives are examples of a
buyer's bargaining interests . Seller interests include
profit, market share and future business opportunities.
Values, goals and priorities are sub-elements and are used
to measure and compare the respective party's interests
.
Values may include patriotism, good citizenship or religious
values. Goals may be economic or non-economic. A seller
for instance, may consider economic goals such as profit,
salary or stock options; a promotion or added prestige
within a person's work organization are examples of non-
economic goals.
Risk measures the uncertainties surrounding the
potential bargain as well as the parties' risk tolerance
[Ref. 11: p. 3-14] . Risk is used within the model to gauge
the willingness of the bargaining parties to gamble
bargaining interests in order to gain additional
concessions
.
Bargaining skill is defined within the model as the
bargaining participants' ability to assimilate and apply the
elements of information, relationship and interests towards
60
maximization of the bargaining outcome [Ref . 11: p. 3-13]
.
Alternatively, bargaining skill may be defined as the,
"personal capacity of the bargainer to shift elements of the
bargaining situation in his favor" [Ref. 15: p. 39] .
Experience, persuasion, and communication are sub-elements
of bargaining skill in the model approach.
Bargaining tactics are the linking mechanism that
connects the determinants of bargaining to the assertion of
bargaining power [Ref. 5: p. 47] . In other words, the
application of bargaining tactics leads to a realization or
understanding of bargaining power. A single tactic or
combination of tactics forms a bargaining strategy or
approach. Application of bargaining tactics as a function
of bargaining power lead to the bargaining outcome.
The elements and sub-elements presented within the
model are not meant to be comprehensive or cover every
possible bargaining situation. For the same reasons that
every possible bargaining strategy and tactic cannot be
addressed in this chapter, neither can every possible
determinant in a strategic bargaining encounter be addressed
in the model. Pen makes use of a similar limitation in
describing his general model of bargaining when he states,
"Because all social phenomena are to a certain degree
interdependent, all phenomena are, intrinsically,
determining factors in the outcome of the bargaining
process." [Ref. 15: p. 27] The model should however, if it
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correctly serves its purpose, illuminate the bargaining
positions of the parties in the procurement scenario, the
potential choices for bargaining strategies or approaches
that each party might consider, as well as the advantages
and disadvantages of these potential strategies.
D . SUMMARY
This chapter began with the an overview of bargaining
strategy and tactics. Bargaining tactics are the means
through which strategic goals and objectives are
accomplished. Bargaining strategy is a plan for the
attainment of bargaining goals or objectives. Bargaining
strategy is implemented through bargaining tactics. Various
tactics and strategies were presented to illustrate the
range of potential tactics and strategies which might be
applied in a given bargaining scenario.
The latter portion of the chapter presented a general
model of the bargaining process. The model views bargaining
outcomes as a function of bargaining power, which in turn,
is dependent on a number of possible determinants of
bargaining power. The determinants of bargaining power
proposed were information, alternatives, bargaining skill,
the buyer and seller relationship, time, interests and risk.
Bargaining tactics are key to the model approach.
Tactics are the vehicle through which information is
solicited, interpreted and applied, the means of expressing
bargaining power and the means of applying bargaining power
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towards the attainment of a specific bargaining outcome, or
a range of bargaining outcomes. Bargaining tactics thus
connect the determinants of bargaining power to the
formation of bargaining power and ultimately, to bargaining
outcomes
.
The Model for the Determinants of Bargaining Power and
Bargaining Outcomes suggests that each bargainer's choice of
tactics should follow one of three broad approaches: (1) to
solicit, interpret or apply information; (2) express
bargaining power: real, implied or potential; or, (3)
apply bargaining power towards the attainment of a specific
bargaining outcome, or a range of bargaining outcomes.
Information may take the form of any one of the elements or
sub-elements which make up the determinants of bargaining
power. An analysis of how these tactics may be applied in
the bargaining process and how the model fits the approaches
used by Government procurement specialists in the specific
case of the CONSTELLATION procurement scenario will be







This chapter presents the results of a survey of 62
Department of Defense contracting specialists. The purpose
of the survey was to determine and assess what types of
tactics, strategies and general bargaining approaches DoD
contracting specialists have used in the past, and would use
in the future when faced with a situation similar to the
CONSTELLATION procurement scenario.
The information presented in this chapter is arranged
in the order in which it appears in the survey. Demographic
information is presented first. A statistical presentation
of the responses given to the five primary survey questions
makes up the middle portion of the chapter. The latter
portion of the chapter presents the results of the
bargaining preferences portion of the survey. Readers can
find a complete version of the survey in the Appendix.
B. DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
A total of 11 questions were included in the
demographics section of the survey. The questions were
oriented towards establishing an estimate of the relative
experience and education of the survey population sampling.
Age and gender were surveyed in order to seek possible
correlations between other survey questions and these
variables. Three of the 11 questions were optional:
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Question 1, Name; Question 6, Command, and Question 8, E-
mail address.
The following paragraphs summarize the demographic
information portion of the survey. Some questions contain
less than 62 responses due to non-response or multiple
responses to the question.
The first question reviewed by the researcher was the
question of age. Fifty-seven participants in the survey
answered this question. The results are summarized in
Table 1. The cumulative response to this question broken
DEMOGRAPHICS QUESTION 2: AGE
20-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 50-55 56-60 61 +
8 7 15 10 6 5 4 2
Table 1. Source: Developed by researcher.
down by percentage is portrayed graphically in Figure 2
.
Question 3 asked the survey participants their gender.
Fifty-nine survey participants answered this question.






Table 2. Source: Developed by researcher.
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Figure 2 . Source : Developed by researcher .
Figure 3 shows graphically the percentages of male and
the other survey questions. The survey participant's rank
or pay grade was also requested in order to determine if a




Figure 3. Source: Developed by researcher.
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other survey questions. Fifty-seven of those who answered
the survey responded to this question, the results of which
are summarized in Table 3. Over one-third of the
respondents held a pay grade of GS-09 or higher. The
largest group of respondents came from the GS-07 group,
which accounted for 20% of the total.
DEMOGRAPHICS QUESTION 4 : RANK/PAY GRADE
E4 E5 E6 E7/8 GS6 GS7 GS9 GS11 GS13 05
2 6 4 2 9 13 4 6 10 1
Table 3. Source: Developed by researcher.
Twenty-seven percent of the respondent's were military and






Figure 4 . Source : Developed by researcher
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The number of years of Government contracting
experience was also asked of the survey participants. The
response is shown in Table 4 . Forty-nine percent of the
survey group reported at least six years Government
contracting experience. The single largest group of survey
respondents, however, reported 1 year or less experience.
DEMOGRAPHICS QUESTION 9: GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING EXPERIENCE
0-1 2-3 4-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26 +
17 8 6 13 5 6 4 2
Table 4. Source: Developed by researcher.
This 0-1 years experience group made up 28% of the
total survey sample size. These results are illustrated
graphically in Figure 5.
Figure 5 . Source : Developed by researcher
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Education was one additional piece of demographic
information which the researcher felt might be useful in
assessing the survey data. Table 5 lists the results
received from demographics Question 10. One hundred percent
DEMOGRAPHICS QUESTION 10: EDUCATION
Level of Education Attained Responses
Some High School
High School Diploma (or GED) 7
Some College 20
Associate ' s Degree 5
Bachelor's Degree 16
Some Graduate Level Courses 6
Master's Degree 3
Doctorate Degree 1
Table 5 . Source : Developed by researcher .
of the survey participants held a high school diploma or
equivalent. Forty-five percent reported a bachelor's degree
or higher. A graphical illustration of the survey
respondents' answers to demographics Question 10 can be
found in Figure 6
.
C. SURVEY QUESTIONS
The following questions made up the central portion of
the survey questionnaire, Part III. The purpose of these
questions was three-fold: (1) to ascertain the extent to

















Figure 6 . Source : Developed by researcher .
the type of procurement dilemma posed in the CONSTELLATION
procurement scenario (Part II of the Questionnaire), (2)
gauge how Government contracting specialists perceived a
take-it-or-leave-it " offer, and (3), to consider the
bargaining strategy and tactics that the survey participants
would use to resolve the bargaining impasse presented in the
bargaining scenario.
l.a. Survey Question 1
Have you ever had to buy goods and services under





Yes , once : 2 .
b No, never : 38 .
c. Yes, a couple of times: 11.
d. Yes, several times: 6.
e. Yes, at least one occasion per month: 0.
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f. Other: 2.
The purpose of Question 1 was to assess the degree to
which the survey participants had faced a situation similar
to that portrayed in the CONSTELLATION procurement scenario.
The respondents' answers to this question may be viewed
graphically in Figure 7 . Twenty-one out of the 57
participants who answered this question, or 35%, answered in
the affirmative. Two fill-in responses, indicating an
affirmative response were received. One fill-in response




Figure 7 . Source : Developed by researcher .
was, "lots of times," while the other respondent using the
fill-in option answered by stating, "Yes, but only under the
Small Purchase Threshold."
2. a. Survey Question 2
Rank the following elements according to their
importance to resolving the bargaining impasse with San
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Diego Valve and Industrial (SDVI) . (Rank your top ten
choices. Rank your most important element with a "1" and
your least important element with a "10".)
b. Responses
SURVEY QUESTION 2 RESULTS
Answer Freq Mean Median Mode Std Dev Range
a. Your credibility 25 7.19 9 10 3.04 1-10
b. Buyer/seller
relationship
36 5.64 6 6 2.44 1-10
c. Communication
effectiveness
52 5.20 5 5 2.23 1-9
d. Alternatives 39 5.26 5 7 2.67 1-10
e. Understanding Govt
interests
43 4.51 4 3 2.77 1-10
f. Understanding
seller interests
30 7.40 8 9 2.48 2-10
g. Building a
relationship
40 6.53 7 10 2.91 1-10
h. Finding a middle
ground
48 5.60 6 8 2.80 1-10
i. Objective bargaining 31 6.74 7 8 2.08 1-10
j . Arguing the price is
unreasonable
20 7.40 7 8 1.39 5-10
k. Knowing what you are
buying
50 3.54 2 2 2.58 1-10
1. Commitment to a fair
and reasonable price
50 3.78 3 1 2.78 1-10
m. Time available 47 4.37 4 4 2.75 1-10
n. Effort exerted 29 6.30 6 4 2.62 1-10
Table 6 . Source : Developed by researcher .
Fourteen possible answers and one fill-in-the-blank option
were offered under this question. Each of the 14 elements
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is identified in Table 6, along with a number of key
descriptive statistics. The answers to Question 2 were
ranked on a scale of 1-10 with "1" representing the highest
ranking; the mean scores should be interpreted accordingly
Answer 2c, "Your effectiveness as a communicator, " was
cited most frequently as a factor. Answers 2k, "Knowing
what you are buying," and 21, "Your commitment to ensuring
the Government receives a fair and reasonable price,
"
received the highest mean scores, with relative mean
rankings of 3.54 and 3.78, respectively. Figure 8
graphically portrays the mean and frequency for the answers
received to Question 2.
Question 2: Mean and Frequency
g_ Mean
^_Freq
Figure 8 . Source : Developed by researcher
.
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Survey questions 3 and 4 were included within the
survey to establish a basis for how the survey participants
viewed a take it or leave it offer. The responses received
for each question are summarized in Tables 7 and 8 and are
portrayed graphically in Figures 9 and 10.
QUESTION 3: A TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT
OFFER FROM A SOLE SOURCE OF SUPPLY IS
Answer Responses
a. Always the final word.




c. The final word over one
half of the time.
31
Table 7 . Source : Developed by researcher .
Sixty percent of the survey participants chose answer
Participant's Reaction to a Take It





Figure 9 . Source : Developed by researcher
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3c, "final word over one half the time", for Question 3
QUESTION 4 : A TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT
OFFER FROM A SOLE SOURCE OF SUPPLY CAN
Answer Responses
a. occasionally be negotiated 25
b. can usually be negotiated. 18
c. can almost always be negotiated. 10
Table 8 . Source : Developed by researcher .
Forty-seven percent chose answer 4a, "can occasionally be
negotiated," for Question 4.
Question 4: Can A Take It or






Figure 10. Source: Developed by researcher.
3. a. Survey Question 5
Survey Question 5 was designed to ascertain what types
of bargaining tactics or strategies the survey participants
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would consider under the CONSTELLATION procurement scenario.
Eighteen distinct strategies or tactics were offered, as
well as a fill-in the blank option for writing in any
strategy or tactic not listed. The question and answer
choices are restated below:
Which bargaining strategies or tactics have you used in the
past, or would attempt to use in the future to resolve the
bargaining impasse with San Diego Valve and Industrial
(SDVI), assuming that it was not possible to find another




a. Appeal to seller's patriotism.
b. Implicitly notify the seller that future Government
business for his firm may be sharply curtailed unless he
bargains in good faith.
c. Tell the seller in no uncertain terms that future
Government business for his firm may be sharply curtailed
unless he bargains in good faith.
d. Tell the seller that you need his help in order to
determine that the offered price is fair and reasonable.
e. Threaten to bypass the seller's representative you
are dealing with and appeal for a fair and reasonable price
to his boss.
f. Use probing questions (e.g., How did the seller
arrive at the price he is asking for the part) in order to
test the firmness of the seller's position.
g. Inform the seller of possible alternatives to
buying the part from the seller (e.g., possibly repairing
the valve )
.
h. Lie to the seller by informing him that you have
another source of supply.
i. Tell the seller that you plan to bring in higher
management to assist you.
j. Make a low ball counter-offer.
k. Make a counter-offer explaining the amount offered
is all you have.
1. Explain that the seller's price is much higher than
what you expect the part should cost and ask for a cost
breakdown
.
m. "Walk away" from the seller's offer, with the hope
that you can resume bargaining on better terms later on.
n. Offer the sole source a letter contract.
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o. Tell the seller, "You have got to do better than
that !"
p. Tell the seller that a new design for the part you
wish to buy from him is "In the works."
q. Tell the seller that his position has angered your
boss .
r. Patiently wait for the seller to offer a better
deal
.
s . Other bargaining approaches you would use or have
used in the past.
b . Responses
Twenty of 57 survey participants failed to rank the
choices given to answer Question 5. The respondents instead
checked off their choices without indicating any answer
preference. Figure 11 shows the Question 5 answer data
without taking into account any ranking or answer
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Figure 11. Source: Developed by researcher
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preference. Figure 12 shows the mean and frequency results
for the group of 37 participants that ranked their preferred
choices. In both cases, four choices were found to have the
highest frequencies: (1) tactic 5d, "Tell the seller you
need his help in order to determine that the price is fair
and reasonable," (2) tactic 5f, "Use probing questions
(e.g., How did the seller arrive at the price he is asking
for the part) in order to test the firmness of the seller's
position," (3) tactic 5g, "Inform the seller of possible
alternatives to buying the part from the seller (e.g.,
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that the seller' s price is much higher than what you expect
the part should cost and ask for a cost breakdown." These
the answers chosen by the 37 survey participants that ranked
their answers.
D. BARGAINING PREFERENCES
Part V of the research survey entitled, "Bargaining
Preferences" was included to assess the survey participant's
preference for one of three general bargaining approaches
.
The respondents were asked to rate three bargaining
approaches, (1) a principled, or interested-based approach,
(2) a "Hard" position-based approach, and (3), a "Soft"
position-based approach. This portion of the survey was
adapted from Fisher and Dry's Getting to Yes [Ref. 31: p.
13] .
Survey participants were asked to rank each set of
bargaining approaches by placing a "1" next to their most
preferred response, a "2" next to their second preferred
response and a "3" next to their least preferred response.
Thirteen sets of responses were offered to the survey
participants consisting of three bargaining approaches, one
principled, one hard-position based and one soft-position
based. The primary responses received to each question are
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The principled approach was clearly the preferred
first choice among the survey participants. Seventy-five
percent of the survey participants' first choice responses
reflected the principled bargaining approach, eight percent
of first choice answers reflected a hard position approach
and 17 percent reflected a soft position approach. Figure
14 shows the cumulative preferences for the six possible
primary and secondary choice combinations. The first
column, P/S, represents choosing the answer reflecting a
principled approach first, and the answer reflecting a soft-
position approach second. P/H represents the selection of a
principled approach as first choice and hard-position
approach as second choice, and so forth. Three answer
combinations made up 90 percent of the responses: the





a. Participation 45 4 3
b. Goals 32 5 12
c. Relationship 36 17
d . Problem-Solving 44 7 2
e . Tr ist 29 2 21
f. Position 38 11 3
g. Approach 30 1 21
h. Bottom-Line 32 8 13
i . Concessions 49 3 3
j . Answers 41 9 4
k. Insist on 38 1 12
1. Will/Conviction 44 1 5




Table 9 . Source : Developed by researcher .
principled/soft position combination accounted for 49
percent of the answer combinations, followed by
principled/hard position with 26 percent and the soft
position/principled combination with 15 percent.
E . SUMMARY
This chapter presented a summary of the results
obtained from surveys of 62 DoD contracting specialists
located in contracting offices throughout the United States
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Figure 14. Source: Developed by researcher
percent of the participants were female. The median age
bracket for the participants was 31 to 35 years of age.
Seventy-three percent of the participants were civil service
employees and 27 percent were military officer or enlisted
personnel . The median years of experience bracket for the
survey respondents was 4-5 years.
Part III of the survey was comprised of five questions
designed to evaluate the survey participant's experience
with a purchasing scenario similar to the CONSTELLATION
purchasing scenario and to evaluate what types of bargaining
strategy, tactics and approaches the survey participants
would use in that type of scenario. In response to survey
Question 1, 35 percent of the participants indicated that
they had been involved in a purchasing scenario similar to
83
percent indicated no experience with a scenario like the
CONSTELLATION scenario.
Question 2 asked the survey participants to rank 14
elements of bargaining on a scale of 1-10. The four
elements with the highest mean rankings were "Knowing what
you are buying," with a mean score of 3.54, "Your commitment
to ensuring the Government receives a fair and reasonable
price," with a mean score of 3.78, "The amount of time
available for you to solve the problem," with a mean of 4.37
and "Your understanding of the Government's interests," with
a mean score of 4.51.
Questions 3 and 4 were included to evaluate the survey
respondent's perceptions with respect to a take-it-or-leave-
it offer from a sole source of supply. Sixty percent of the
participants felt that a take-it-or-leave-it offer from a
sole source was the final word over one half of the time.
Forty-seven percent of the respondents indicated that a
take-it-or-leave-it offer from a sole source of supply could
occasionally be negotiated. Thirty-four percent felt a
take-it-or-leave-it offer from a sole source of supply could
usually be negotiated, and 19 percent of the respondents
felt that a take-it-or-leave-it offer from a sole source of
supply could almost always be negotiated.
Question 5 asked the survey respondents to rank a
series of bargaining strategies and tactics. The most
frequently cited strategy or tactic was "Explain the
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seller's price is much higher than what you expect the part
should cost and request a cost breakdown, " followed by, "Use
probing questions in order to test the firmness of the
seller's position." These two answers also received the
highest mean rankings
.
The last portion of the survey asked the survey
participants to rank 13 sets of choices that reflected one
of three bargaining approaches: (1) principled, (2) hard
position, and (3) soft position. Seventy-five percent of
the responses indicated a primary preference for a
principled approach. Seventeen percent of the responses
indicated a soft position approach as a first choice and







The focus of this chapter is to analyze the principal
and secondary thesis questions in light of the theoretical
framework established in Chapter II, the general model of
bargaining proposed in Chapter III and the results of the
survey discussed in Chapter IV. Analysis of four of the six
principal survey questions forms the basis for this chapter,
with the objective of drawing inferences which can be
applied to the CONSTELLATION procurement scenario.
Question 1 of the survey was evaluated to test the
hypothesis of whether procurement situations like the
CONSTELLATION scenario actually occur within the Department
of Defense. Question 2 was analyzed to determine what
bargaining elements might be important in a procurement
scenario like the CONSTELLATION scenario. Question 5 was
evaluated to learn what strategies and tactics might be
effective in purchasing scenarios like the CONSTELLATION
scenario
.
The data obtained from the bargaining preferences
portion of the survey were analyzed to ascertain what type
of bargaining approach is preferred, or is most likely to be
used by a Government procurement specialist. This portion
of the analysis should assist an evaluation of what
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bargaining approach should be taken by Government buyers in
cases like the CONSTELLATION procurement case.
B. THE MODEL AND THE CONSTELLATION SCENARIO
Analyzing the CONSTELLATION scenario in light of the
Model of the Determinants of Bargaining Power and Bargaining
Outcomes is a useful first step in the analysis process.
Discussion of the primary determinants of bargaining power
associated with the model, namely, alternatives, interests,
the buyer-seller relationship, bargaining skill, time, risk,
and the overarching determinant of information, and their
relationship to the CONSTELLATION case will help to further
define the bargaining scenario.
First, consider Alternatives . The Government buyer is
apparently given no acceptable alternative other than to buy
the parts from San Diego Valve and Industrial (SDVI), if he
is to acquire the parts on time. No other suppliers are
known to exist, and the possibility of finding a suitable
substitute for the parts appears remote. Manufacturing two
replacement valves is an unacceptable alternative due to the
limited time involved. Repairing the valves, even
temporarily, might be a possible alternative, but the
feasibility of this alternative is not known without further
information
.
Next, consider the buyer-seller relationship. The
Government buyer is clearly placed in a position where he is
highly dependent on the seller, due to the sole source
nature and urgency of the requirement. A lack of trust on
the part of the buyer appears to be present. Prior business
dealings and the seller's reputation are not mentioned, and
therefore cannot be considered. It would however, be
prudent to consider these factors if more information
surrounding these elements were known.
The take-it-or-leave-it approach taken by the seller,
SDVI, implies a degree of coldness. The seller refuses to
engage in communication which would enhance the buyer'
s
ability to complete the bargain. This approach also
suggests the seller holds a bargaining advantage. As stated
in Blair, Kaiserman and Romano's analysis, a credible take-
it-or-leave-it offer by a seller in the case of supplier
domination leaves the buyer with no other choice but to
accept the offer [Ref. 18:p. 839]. In the CONSTELLATION
scenario however, if the buyer accepts the seller's offer as
initially stated, the buyer violates his fiduciary duty to
the Government by failing to ensure a fair and reasonable
price. There may be a legitimate purpose for SDVI's take-
it-or-leave-it approach other than to simply exert
bargaining power and a bargaining outcome favorable to the
seller [Ref. 9:p. 217-219] . SDVI might actually be pricing
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the valves in accordance with a fair and reasonable pricing
policy [Ref. 9:p. 217-219]. SDVI might also be unwilling to
provide further information such as cost or pricing
information for fear that such information might leak to
competitors and damage its position in the market [Ref. 9:p.
217-219] . Without further information however, it is not
possible to assess these possibilities.
The impact of the buyer and seller's bargaining skills
are indeterminate in the procurement scenario. No
bargaining, beyond the presentation of the seller's initial
offer, has taken place. Whether the introduction of the
buyer and seller's bargaining skills would actually have an
impact on the bargaining outcome is an issue where the
theory of bargaining is not in agreement.
The Model of the Determinants of Bargaining Power and
Bargaining Outcomes suggests that, all other factors being
equal, that the bargaining party with superior bargaining
skill holds a bargaining advantage which could be exploited
to enhance the party' s bargaining position and bargaining
power. For instance, it would certainly enhance the
Government buyer' s position if he could use an advantage in
bargaining skills to convince SDVI to reveal enough
information for the buyer to make a fair and reasonable
price determination.
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An appeal to SDVI's interests might be an effective
bargaining strategy for the Government buyer to use. A
private enterprise such as SDVI normally considers profit a
primary interest. However, SDVI may have other interests
which may or may not fully agree with the immediate profit
interest involved with the sale of the valves. SDVI may
have an interest in future business with the Government.
SDVI may also have interests in maintaining its reputation
and the goodwill of its name. There are certainly many more
interests that might be attributable to SDVI in the
CONSTELLATION case.
A buyer who realizes that SDVI has other interests and
that they may not be 100 percent in concert with the take-
it-or-leave-it approach offered in the CONSTELLATION
scenario possesses a useful bargaining tool with which to
apply bargaining leverage. One tactic available to the
buyer for instance, is to counter the take-it-or-leave-it
position of SDVI by asserting that such an approach or offer
would curtail future business with the Government. The
success or failure of such a tactic may be influenced by the
other bargaining determinants in the model, including the
parties' perception of risk, and the time available to
complete the bargain.
Time is a bargaining determinant which appears to weigh
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heavily against the buyer. The cost of delay in completing
the procurement beyond the time allowed, while indefinite,
appears to be large. Time limits the ability of the buyer
to gather and assimilate information and the number of
practical alternatives. Limited time may also limit the
Government buyer' s ability to assert any advantage in
bargaining skill, if such an advantage were to exist.
Time may also play a factor in the seller's approach to
the procurement. Whether the seller knows that the valves
are urgently required is not known from the scenario. If
the seller does hold that information, it is certainly the
type of information that could be used to create bargaining
power and reinforce the seller's initial offer. Time could
also work to the disadvantage of SDVI . SDVI might need an
immediate infusion of cash to pay off creditors for example,
and thus might not be able to wait out a patient Government
buyer. Additional information related to the time element
would clarify what impact this element would have on the
bargaining process.
The element of risk is certainly present in the
procurement scenario, yet difficult to evaluate. The buyer
is certainly faced with considerable risk. The buyer must
consider both the risk of not securing the parts on time, as
well as the risk of purchasing the parts at a price which is
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unfair or unreasonable. The buyer's level of risk
tolerance, or willingness to risk conflict, may affect the
buyer's decision making process on multiple levels including
the buyer' s perceptions of the advantages and disadvantages
of not accepting the seller's offer [Ref. 15:p. 32]. The
seller's perception of risk is an unknown and may only come
to light through the application of an effective combination
of bargaining strategy and tactics. Once more, it would be
to the buyer's advantage to direct his bargaining approach
towards discovering more information related to this primary
model determinant. Information related to the seller's
perception of risk could expose a weakness which could be
used to further the Government buyer's bargaining position.
When viewed in light of the CONSTELLATION scenario,
Information appears to be a common requirement when
assessing the other model bargaining determinants.
Information, in fact, does encompass the other bargaining
determinants of time, bargaining skill, risk, the buyer-
seller relationship, alternatives and interests , since the
level of information each party holds with respect to these
bargaining elements affects how these elements affect the
bargaining process. The selection of appropriate strategy
and tactics for the purpose of exploiting any primary
bargaining determinant and creating potential bargaining
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power [Ref. 5:p. 179] is thus inextricably linked to
gathering, assimilating, or using information.
C. BARGAINING THEORY AND THE CONSTELLATION SCENARIO
The previous discussions on bargaining theory have
enhanced the analysis so far, and additional comparisons
here between theory and the hypothetical case scenario may
enhance our understanding of the results obtained from the
survey data.
In the CONSTELLATION scenario, the Government is not
concerned with a profit, but with a fair and reasonable
price. The work of Edgeworth, Bowley and others states that
under bilateral monopoly conditions, a contract curve
representing a range of possible prices may be established.
The upper bound of the contract curve is determined by the
maximum price which the buyer is willing to accept. In the
Bowley case, this price is the price that equals the buyer's
marginal revenue for the quantity traded. For the
CONSTELLATION case, this upper boundary limit can be
substituted with the highest price that the buyer would
determine to be fair and reasonable. At any point above
this price, the buyer is ethically and legally bound to
refuse the offer, regardless of the circumstances of the
customer or end user. Certainly the buyer could violate the
fair and reasonable price requirement, but if the buyer did
so, the buyer would summarily, be acquiescing to the demands
of the seller. By making this assumption then, we assume
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the solution to the question of price, and the principal and
other subsidiary questions addressed in this research become
moot .
The lower limit of the contract curve may be viewed as
the seller's marginal costs associated with the valve. From
the viewpoint of the work of Bowley and subsequent analysis
by Blair, Kaiserman and Romano, as well as others, it is
implicit or explicit that profit will act as a primary
motivating force in the seller's pricing decision. Thus,
the seller would not sell the valves at any price less than
the marginal costs incurred. If Pen's work were interjected
here, numerous other factors could be added to the basic
formula. It is sufficient for this analysis however, to use
Bowley 's work, while keeping in mind that other factors
accounted for by Pen's ophelimity functions could also
influence the seller's pricing strategy.
The seller in the CONSTELLATION scenario is clearly in
a dominant position. Given the urgency of need for items
being procured and potential costs to the Government if the
purchase is delayed, there can be little doubt that the
buyer would accept any price so long as that price was fair
and reasonable. Following Bowley' s analysis then for the
case where a dominant monopolist sells to a price-taking
monopsonist, the price solution for the CONSTELLATION case
can be found at the highest point on the contract curve. In
other words, the highest possible price that a buyer would
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conclude to be fair and reasonable.
Without adequate information however, there is no way
for either the buyer to determine what the seller's costs
are, or the seller to determine what the highest price the
buyer would consider fair and reasonable. Thus, bargaining
must take place to determine what price will result.
The theory and analyses discussed in Chapter II and the
Model of the Determinants of Bargaining Power and Bargaining
Outcomes suggest that certain elements of bargaining may be
effective in moving the participants towards a bargaining
agreement . Our analysis of the answers obtained from the
survey of Government contracting personnel will continue
with these elements in mind.
D. ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL SURVEY QUESTIONS
Survey Question 1 asked survey participants if they had
ever had to buy goods and services under conditions similar
to the USS CONSTELLATION procurement scenario. Twenty-one
participants out of 59, or 35 percent, answered with an
affirmative response. Of those answering the question in
the affirmative, 18, or 85 percent of the respondents
indicated that they had experienced this sort of buying
situation on more than one occasion. Out of 17 survey
respondents reporting 11 or more years of Government
contracting experience, ten respondents, or 59 percent,




The results obtained in response to Question 1 thus
support the researcher' s hypothesis that procurement
situations paralleling the CONSTELLATION scenario are
experienced by Government contract specialists working
within the DoD. The data also suggest that the probability
of such an experience happening appears to increase with the
number of years of experience on the job.
Survey Question 2 asked the survey participants to rank
14 separate bargaining elements on a scale of one to ten
with one being the highest rank on the scale. The
cumulative survey results revealed five bargaining elements
with mean scores significantly lower than the sample mean of
5.42. These answer choices also had scores at or near the
top five scores for median, mode and frequency, suggesting a
preference for these elements within the survey group.
These elements were evaluated using a Z statistic test to
determine whether the answers were statistically
significant
.
The five elements with the lowest mean scores (and
therefore, highest ranking), were: (1) answer 2k, "Knowing
what you are buying," with a mean score of 3.54, (2) answer
21, "Your commitment to ensuring the Government receives a
fair and reasonable price," with a mean of 3.78, (3) answer
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2m, "The amount of time available to you to resolve the
problem," with a mean score of 4.37, (4) answer 2e "Your
understanding of the Government's interests, with a mean
score of 4.51, and (5), answer 2c, "Your effectiveness as a
communicator," with a mean of 5.20.
The five elements of bargaining most frequently
selected by the survey group were (1) answer 2c, "Your
effectiveness as a communicator," with a frequency of 52;
(2) answer 21, with a frequency of 50; (3) answer 2h,
"Finding a middle ground or compromise between you and the
seller that provides for mutual gain," with a frequency of
48; (4) answer 2m with a frequency of 47; and (5), answers
2k, and 2e, which both had a frequency of 43. The rankings
of these answers are summarized in Table 10.
Top Ranked Answers for Question 2
Answer Mode Mean Frequency
21. Commitment to a fair and
reasonable price.
1 2 2
2k. Knowing what you are buying. 2 1 5




2m. The amount of time available. 4 3 4
2n. The amount of effort you exert
to resolve the problem.
4 8 11




2h. Finding a middle ground. 9 7 3
Table 10. Source: Developed by researcher
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In order to test whether the difference in mean ranking
scores for answers 21, 2k, 2e, 2m and 2c were statistically
significant, the a statistical test using the Z test
statistic was developed. The results of the test are
summarized in Table 11.
Null Hypothesis :
Ho: /j. > // c
The observed mean for answers 21, 2k, 2e, 2m and 2c is
less than the sample mean.
Alternative Hypothesis :
Ha: /u <= ^
The sample mean is greater than or equal to the
observed mean for samples 21, 2k, 2e, 2m and 2c.
Decision rule: Reject Ho if X - Un < Za
5/Sn
Significance level a = .01
Sample size n = 55
Z 01 = 2.33
Decision :
Reject the null hypothesis for answer 2c. Do not
reject the null hypothesis for answers 2k, 21, 2m or 2e.
Interpretation :
The mean scores for answers 2k, 21, 2m and 2e are lower
than the sample mean, suggesting that these bargaining
elements were considered more important by the survey
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Z Test Statistic Results for Question 2
Answer Z Value P Value
2c. Effectiveness as a
communicator .
.7804 .23
2k. Knowing what you are
buying
.
5.098 less than .00001
21. Commitment to a fair and
reasonable price.
4.474 less than .00001







Table 11. Source: Developed by researcher.
respondents in cases similar to the CONSTELLATION
procurement scenario.
This interpretation however, cannot be made for answer
2c. A preference for answer 2c cannot be determined based
on the test statistic. The fact that this answer had the
highest frequency and a relatively low standard deviation of
2.23 however, leads one to believe that this answer was
considered to be of medium importance within the survey
group. This conclusion is also supported by the fact that
the relationship between mean and frequency for the answers
obtained in Question two had a high negative correlation of
-.8011. Z statistic tests were performed on the other
answer choices for Question 2 and no other answers were
found to be statistically less than the sample mean.
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The bargaining elements determined to be statistically
significant in Question 2 may be analyzed in terms of the
bargaining theories presented in Chapter II and The Model of
the Determinants of Bargaining Power and Bargaining
Outcomes . Each answer viewed as significant by the survey
group carries within it elements of important bargaining
strategies and tactics. The answers may also correlate to
the theories of bargaining discussed in Chapter II.
Answer 21, "Your commitment to ensuring the Government
receives a fair and reasonable price, " reflects the
importance perceived by the survey respondents in holding a
high aspiration level [Ref. 19:p. 61] for obtaining a fair
and reasonable price. The strategy of maintaining a high
level of commitment reflects determination, resolve and
steadfastness. Commitment implies a low rate of concession
[Ref. 19:p. 90]. Siegel and Fouraker's research found that
if a bargainer has a low rate of concession, it often leads
to a lowering of his opponent's aspirations [Ref. 19:p. 70].
In the CONSTELLATION case, it seems reasonable to believe
that an unwavering commitment on the part of the Government
buyer might move the seller to lowering his profit
aspiration, which in turn might lead to an offer of a more
reasonable price.
Answer 2k, "Knowing what you are buying," reflects the
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importance of knowledge and information, in this case
knowledge of the part to be procured. The Government buyer
appears to lack sufficient information with which to
complete the purchase of the valves. Knowledge and
information about the valves is crucial to determining
whether the price offered is fair and reasonable. Analyses
discussed in Chapter II which concluded that price under a
bilateral monopoly scenario was determinant all found it
necessary to assume at a minimum that knowledge of the
supplier's cost function and buyer's demand functions were
known to both parties.
It should be apparent that if the Government buyer in
the CONSTELLATION case had access to information regarding
the seller's costs for the valves, then the buyer could
readily determine if the price offered was fair and
reasonable. Without adequate information however, the buyer
in the CONSTELLATION case cannot determine if the price is
fair and reasonable. This conclusion is fully supported by
the theory, and one added piece of analysis should clarify
this conclusion for the skeptical reader.
As one of the most critical elements in the
CONSTELLATION scenario, the question of what is a fair and
reasonable price merits detailed analysis. The analysis is
problematic in the CONSTELLATION case however, because the
102
buyer appears to lack the information needed to complete a
satisfactory cost or price analysis. One approach suggested
by one of the readers of this research was to analyze the
question based on the original acquisition price, the number
of years since the part was originally manufactured, the
offered price and the rate of return achieved.
The number of years elapsed since the original parts
were manufactured is not stated in the procurement scenario.
It is stated however, that the manufacturer went out of
business twenty years ago. Assuming the valves were twenty
years old, the annual rate of return (ROR) required for a
$1,500 (the original unit cost for the valve) investment to
reach a value of $45,000 (the offered price for one unit)
can be solved using the following formula:
$1,500 X (1 + ROR) :o = $45,000
ROR = .1853
Rates of return can likewise be computed for other time
periods, as illustrated in Table 12.
The rate of return approach leaves the researcher with
two problems to resolve: one easily reconciled, the other
intractable. A fair and reasonable rate of return can
easily be determined for a given period of time. One
approach for instance, might be based on the rates of return
offered for Treasury bills during the same time period, with
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Rates of Return and Number of Years Required
for a $1,500 Investment to Appreciate to $45,000









Table 12 . Source : Developed by researcher .
premiums added in for inflation, storage costs and business
risk. Two problems that cannot be readily resolved using
the rate of return approach are determining the number of
years to use to calculate the rate of return and the initial
acquisition cost. Assuming that the part originally cost
the seller $1,500 and that he held the part for 30 years, a
twelve percent rate of return and $45,000 unit cost might be
considered fair and reasonable. An eighteen percent rate of
return might arguably be considered to be fair and
reasonable if the part cost the seller $1,500 and he held
the part for twenty years. "Fair and reasonable" after all
is an imprecise and relative term that must be evaluated
based on the specific elements of each purchasing scenario.
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However, if the part had been bought at auction the year
prior for $200, then it is doubtful any reasonable and
informed individual would consider a $45,000 price offer to
be considered fair or reasonable. Sufficient information
then is a key to navigating the bargaining impasse posed in
the CONSTELLATION scenario and determining what is a fair
and reasonable price.
The Government buyer is placed at a considerable
bargaining disadvantage by not knowing more about the part
he is buying. The seller in turn, derives considerable
bargaining advantage and significant potential bargaining
power by not disclosing any cost or pricing information.
The take-it-or-leave-it approach taken by the seller
combined with what appears to be an unreasonably high priced
offer, implies that the seller may know that the Government
has a desperate need for the valves . A plausible approach
for the Government buyer in this case may be to redouble his
efforts to get the information he needs to determine if the
price is a fair and reasonable one. Without adequate
information, a fair and reasonable price determination is
impossible. A sound recommendation for the Government buyer
in the CONSTELLATION case would be to tailor his strategy,
tactics and bargaining approach towards convincing the
seller to give him the information he needs to make a fair
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and reasonable price determination.
Answer 2e, "Your understanding of the Government's
interests," reflects the importance of knowing and
understanding what is at stake for the Government in this
case. Two primary interests of the buyer should be evident:
get the parts on time and at a fair and reasonable price.
Getting the parts on time means meeting the customer'
s
requirement, which should always be an interest for a
Government buyer. An added interest closely related to the
customer is avoiding potential costs caused by the delay.
The costs of delay may be very large or they may be
inconsequential. As we saw with the lack of information
about the valves, lack of knowing what the actual costs of
delay are places the buyer at a bargaining disadvantage.
The buyer certainly would not be pressed for time if he knew
that CONSTELLATION could either make do without the parts in
the immediate future, or if there was another practical
alternative. A useful bargaining strategy for the buyer
then may involve fully researching what Government interests
are involved in the case. This might include contacting the
Supply Officer, Chief Engineer or Commanding Officer of the
ship to get their perspective. Fully understanding the
Government's interests in this case then, is clearly an
important factor and a useful approach to the dilemma.
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Answer 2m, "The amount of time available to you to
resolve the problem, " was also rated highly by the survey
respondents and determined to be statistically significant.
The limited amount of time available to the buyer in the
CONSTELLATION case limits the alternatives available to the
buyer. The opportunity to manufacture the valves or find
other sources of supply is certainly curtailed by the lack
of time available. Lack of time limits the buyer's ability
to gather and assess information. The shortage of time may
also limit the effectiveness of tactics and strategy such as
patience, persuasion or commitment that a skilled bargainer
might use to increase his bargaining power.
It would clearly be to the Government buyer's advantage
to devise a way to extend the procurement deadline. The
seller might be very surprised if the Government did not
meet his initial price demand quickly. The risk element for
the seller should be expected to increase as the amount of
time, measured beginning with the initial offer, increases.
Given that the factors that influence the formation of
bargaining power will shift towards the bargaining advantage
of the buyer with the increase in time, such as the
possibility of finding or using other alternatives, the risk
to the seller that the purchase may fall through increases.
If the Government refused to conclude the buy and the
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CONSTELLATION still got underway on time, it might move the
seller to soften his position. If not on price, perhaps
some other type of concession, such as offering additional
information. The element of time then, is certainly an
important element to consider in the CONSTELLATION scenario.
Applying strategy and tactics to shift the bargaining
advantage and bargaining power obtained through the element
of time would certainly work to the benefit of the buyer.
The role that experience plays in determining what
elements of bargaining are important in cases like the
CONSTELLATION scenario was analyzed. Survey participants'
responses were evaluated according to how highly they ranked
the four statistically significant responses and how often
they chose one of the statistically significant responses.
The results obtained are summarized in Table 13.
Table 13 shows the percentage of respondents who ranked
from one to four the statistically significant answers in
Question two according to one of five experience categories
and according to one of three rank ceilings. In the
interpretation of the survey data, it is interesting to note
that the three years or less experience category provided
answer percentages for the four statistically significant
responses equal to or greater than the four or more year
experience category in eight of the nine comparisons. The
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Experience as a Function of Choosing the Four
Statistically Significant Responses to Question 2
Percentage of Statistically Significant













3 or less .24 .36 .28 .88
4 or more .22 .33 .25 .80
6 or more .23 .40 .20 .83
11 or more .18 .41 .18 .76
15 or more .17 .50 .25 .92
Percentage of Statistically Significant














3 or less .40 .28 .12 .80
4 or more .22 .44 .03 . 69
6 or more .23 .43 .03 .70
11 or more .18 .35 .06 .59
15 or more .17 .42 .08 .67
Percentage of Statistically Significant













3 or less .40 .32 .72
4 or more .47 .19 .67
6 or more .47 .20
. 67
11 or more .47 .12 .59
15 or more .50 .167 .67
Table 13. Source: Developed by researcher.
three or less years of experience category also had a higher
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percentage of respondents rank three of the four questions
for each of the rank ceilings. In sum, while it cannot be
concluded that a lack of experience played a role in
choosing and ranking a statistically significant response,
the numbers show that experience totaling four or more years
was not a significant factor in choosing or ranking the four
statistically significant responses to Question 2.
Survey Question 5 asked survey participants to rank the
bargaining tactics or strategies that they have used in the
past in cases similar to the CONSTELLATION case and the
tactics or strategies they would use in the future. The
survey results obtained in response to Question 5 indicated
four preferred tactics. Those answers were (1) answer 51,
"Explain that the seller' s price is much higher than what
you expect the part should cost and ask for a cost
breakdown," (2) answer 5f, "Use probing questions (e.g., How
did the seller arrive at the price he is asking for the
part) in order to test the firmness of the seller's
position," (3) answer 5d, "Tell the seller that you need his
help in order to determine that the offered price is fair
and reasonable," and (4), answer 5g, "Inform the seller of
possible alternatives to buying the part from the seller."
The mean and frequency scores for these four tactics and
their mean ranking relative to the other tactics proposed in
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the question are summarized in Table 14
Question 5 : Mean and Frequency for





















x 5g 32 23 4 .82 4
X 5g 33 24 3.85 4
X 5d 38 26 2.88 3
X 5d 31 24 2.826 2
X 5f 41 26 2.68 1
5f 34 25 2.833 3
X 51 42 29 2.75 2
X 51 31 23 2.52 1
Table 14. Source: Developed by researcher.
In order to determine if the answers listed in Table 14
are statistically significant, a test of the means was
devised in a manner similar to the test used for Question 2.
The test will determine whether the mean scores for answers
5g, 5d, 5f and 51 are statistically significant. Because
the sample size (n) was not very large, a student-t test was





Ho: /u > /u
The observed means for answers 5g, 5d, 5f and 51 are less
than the sample mean.
Alternative Hypothesis :
Ha: /u <= yu
The sample mean is greater than or equal to the observed
mean for samples 5g, 5d, 5f and 51.
Decision rule: Reject Ho if x - Un < t a
5/Vn
Significance level a = .01
Sample size n = 37
Degrees of freedom = n-1
t-36,
.01 ~ Z . h 3 3
Decision :
Reject the null hypothesis for answer 5g: "Inform the
seller of possible alternatives (Have used in the past)".
Do not reject the null hypothesis for all other answers
tested. Test results are summarized in Table 15.
Interpretation :
The mean scores for answer choices 5d, 5f, and 51 are
clearly lower than the sample mean, suggesting that these
bargaining tactics were considered more important in
cases similar to the CONSTELLATION procurement scenario by
the Government procurement specialists surveyed. Answer 5g
112
t Statistic Test Results for Question 5
Answer t Value
5g. Inform seller of possible alternatives.
(Used in Past)
.8064
5g. Inform seller of possible alternatives.
(Use in Future)
2.8164
5d. Tell seller you need his help to determine
price is fair and reasonable. (Used in Past)
4.9260
5d. Tell seller you need his help to determine
price is fair and reasonable. (Use in Future)
5.0428
5f. Use probing guestions. (Used in Past) 5.3591
5f. Use probing guestions. (Use in Future) 5.0270
51. Ask for a cost breakdown. (Used in Past) 5.2076
51. Ask for a cost breakdown. (Use in Future) 5.6998
Table 15. Source: Developed by researcher.
is statistically significant for "Would use in the future,"
but is not significant for the case "Have used in the past.'
Answer 51, "Explain that the seller's price is much higher
than what you would expect the part should cost and ask for
a cost breakdown" had the highest mean ranking of the 19
possible answers in Question 5 for "Would use in the
future," and was ranked second to answer 5f, "Use probing
guestions." Answer 5d, "Tell the seller you need his
help," was ranked second for "Would use in the future" and
third for have used in the past. The three mean scores are
very close for these three answers, so close that there is
no statistically significant difference between these three
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answers. In other words, the survey participants preferred
these three choices over the other 16 choices, but did not
prefer any one of the three over the other two.
The significance of answers 5d, 5f and 51 reflects
once again, the need for information. Each of these tactics
can be interpreted as an effort on the part of the
Government buyer's to gain additional information. These
three answers also associate closely with answer 2k,
"Knowing what you are buying, " which carried the highest
mean score for Question 2. The statistical significance of
answers 5d, 5f and 51 also concurs with the bargaining
theory discussed. Without adequate information, a fair and
reasonable price determination appears impossible.
Answer 5g, "Inform the seller of possible alternatives
to buying the part from the seller," proved to be
statistically significant for the "Would use in the future"
condition only. The importance of alternatives and the
strategy of offering these types of alternatives to the
seller have been previously discussed. If the buyer in the
CONSTELLATION case had one or more credible alternatives, he
could choose them over a bargain with SDVI . As implied in
the survey answer, the buyer could also make use of
potential alternatives as a bargaining tool. The
possibility of credible alternatives does not necessarily
14
mean that the seller will alter his position. However, if
it would be to the seller' s advantage to alter his position
in order to avoid a bargaining conflict and potentially lose
the sale, it makes sense to conclude that a rational seller
would take such action. Certainly the other bargaining
elements of risk, buyer-seller relationship, bargaining
skill, time and interests all have an impact on the what
role and the importance of alternatives in a given
procurement scenario. However, not withstanding the
influence of other bargaining elements, the ability to offer
alternatives to a seller in a situation similar to the
CONSTELLATION case was viewed as significant.
The role of experience was evaluated to determine if
experienced contracting personnel would rank higher, or more
frequently choose the four choices determined statistically
significant in Question 5 than inexperienced contracting
personnel. Table 16 shows the mean and frequency for the
four statistically significant answers.
Three years of experience or less was considered
inexperienced. In order to test whether a difference exists
between the mean ranks assigned by experienced and
inexperienced contracting personnel the following




Experienced vs . Inexperienced Personnel
Answer Experienced Inexperienced
Freq Mean Freq Mean
5d. Tell seller
you need his help
(Used in past)
.
18 3.16 8 2.12
5d. Tell seller
you need his help
(Use in future)
.
13 2.53 11 3.09




19 2.42 7 3.14













11 3.82 13 3.88




20 2.90 9 2.44
51. Ask for a cost
breakdown (Use in
future) .
11 3.00 12 2.12
Table 16. Source: Developed by researcher.
Ho: fj.x - My = D
The difference between the means for experienced and
inexperienced contracting personnel for the four
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statistically significant choices is zero.
Alternative Hypothesis :
Ha : iu.. - ixy > D
The mean rank for experienced contracting personnel is
less than the mean rank for inexperienced contracting
personnel
.
Decision rule: Reject Ho if X - y - D o > t
si n x + n y
V n,ny
Significance level a = .01
Sample size nx = 8, n y = 8
t s/ . 01 = 3.499
Result:
t statistic = .468
Decision :
Do not reject the null hypothesis.
Interpretation :
There is insufficient evidence to conclude that there
is a difference between the mean ranking of the answers
given by experienced and inexperienced contracting personnel
to answers 5d, 5f, 5g and 51. In other words, there appears
to be no difference between experienced and inexperienced
contracting personnel in the way they ranked these four
answers
.
The test statistic shows that there is no overall
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difference in the way experienced and inexperienced
contracting personnel ranked these answer choices. However
one answer choice of chosen by the group categorized as
inexperienced stands out with a significant difference.
This is answer 5g, "Inform the seller of possible
alternatives" for the category, "Have used in the past."
This answer choice, with a mean ranking of 6.00, had a mean
that was more than two standard deviations from the overall
mean for the inexperienced personnel responses, which was
3.22. The large difference in the mean rankings for "Have
used in the past," and "Would use in the future" for the
responses given by inexperienced personnel suggests that
inexperienced personnel had not used this tactic in the
past, but felt it would be a worthwhile tactic to use in the
future. It is also appears that the reason why this choice
was not found to be statistically significant when tested
for the entire survey sample was because inexperienced
personnel on average, ranked this answer choice much higher
for the "Have used in the past" category. While the mean
responses for the 5g answer choice "Would use in the future"
category are almost identical for experienced and
inexperienced personnel, experienced personnel assigned a
much lower average score to this response in the "Have used
in the past" category. This suggests that experienced
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personnel were more familiar with this tactic than
inexperienced personnel
.
D. ANALYSIS OF BARGAINING APPROACHES
A survey of bargaining approaches made up the latter
portion of the survey. The overwhelming preference of those
surveyed was to choose a principled or interest-based
approach, over either a hard-position approach or a soft-
position approach. The interest-based approach was clearly
the preferred choice among the Government procurement
specialists surveyed.
Though it should never be assumed that one type of
approach is always correct for a given bargaining scenario,
the potential advantages of using an interest-based approach
in situations analogous to the CONSTELLATION scenario are
apparent. An interest-based approach encourages two-way
dialogue between the bargaining parties and the transfer of
information. An interest-based approach also encourages the
attainment of a middle ground which offers mutual gain.
An interest-based approach avoids the extreme positions
of either the hard or soft-position approaches. A hard-
position approach on the part of the buyer could limit the
range of possible bargains to prices near the lower limit
of the contract curve. Analogously, a soft-position
approach would appear to allow the seller the opportunity to
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push for a bargain closer to the upper limit of the contract
curve. Intuitively, an interest-based approach would appear
more likely to result in a signed contract and a contract
which approaches the theoretical joint-profit maximizing
solution
.
A key question for analysis is whether a Government
buyer' s preferred approach is affected by the number of
years of experience the buyer holds. In order to analyze
this question, the researcher compared the answers provided
by the survey participants with the number of years of
contracting experience each participant acknowledged.
Experienced personnel were once again considered to be any
respondent with four or more years of experience. The
percentage of respondents who gave an interest-based
response to six or less of the 13 bargaining approach















3 or less 25 .16 .48
4 or more 36 .36 .31
6 or more 30 .40 .30
11 or more 17 .41 .29
16 or more 12 .50 .167
Table 17. Source: Developed by researcher
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questions was compared to those participants who responded
with an interest-based answer 11 or more times. The results
are summarized in Table 17.
The results are somewhat surprising but show that there
was less of a preference among the survey participants for
an interest-based approach as their experience increased.
Figure 15 readily shows the weakening preference for an
interest-based approach as experience increases.
An Interest-Based Approach
Response as a Function of Experience
OVBR3 0VBR5 OVBR10 0VBR15
+_ %<7
-«_%>10
Figure 15 . Source : Developed by researcher
F. SUMMARY
This chapter analyzed the survey results presented in
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Chapter IV. Over one-third of the survey respondents
indicated they had experienced a procurement situation
similar to the CONSTELLATION scenario, supporting the
assumption that such cases are more than isolated incidents
Four of 14 bargaining elements offered as choices in
survey Question 2 were found to be statistically
significant. These were "Knowing what you are buying,"
"Your commitment to a fair and reasonable price," "The
amount of time available," and "Understanding the
Government's interests." These answers are supported by the
bargaining theory and the Model of the Determinants of
Bargaining Power and Bargaining Outcomes .
The frequency and mean rankings for the four
statistically significant responses for Question 2 were
compared for both experienced and inexperienced negotiators
using three years of experience or less as a dividing point
between experienced and inexperienced negotiators. The
responses indicated no significant difference between
experienced and inexperienced contracting personnel in the
frequency or ranking of the four responses. In fact, in
eight of nine comparisons for answer selection and rank
combinations, percentages for experienced personnel were




Question 5 of the survey was analyzed to determine what
strategy and tactics were preferred by the survey
respondents. Three of 18 possible survey responses were
found to be statistically significant for both the "Have
used in the past case" and "Would use in the future case."
Those three answers were: (1) "Tell the seller you need his
help in order to determine if the price is fair and
reasonable," (2) "Use probing questions," and (3) "Ask for a
cost breakdown." "Informing the seller of possible
alternatives" was found to be statistically significant for
the "Would use in the future" case.
As with Question 2, the Question 5 responses of
experienced and inexperienced contracting personnel were
compared to see whether there was a difference in the way
the two groups ranked the statistically significant answers.
No difference was found for the seven statistically
significant answer choices. However, a significant
difference was noted in the response for answer 5g, "Inform
the seller of possible alternatives" for the category "Have
used in the past." This choice was found to vary
significantly from the "Would use in the future" response
given by inexperienced personnel for this answer choice as
well as the mean response for this answer given by
experienced personnel. Inexperienced personnel were less
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likely to rank this answer highly for the category "Have
used in the past" than experienced negotiators, suggesting
that inexperienced contracting personnel were less familiar
with this tactic.
The latter portion of the chapter was devoted to an
analysis of the bargaining preferences portion of the
survey. This portion of the survey was designed to evaluate
which of three bargaining approaches, interest-based, hard
position-based or soft position-based, the survey
participants would prefer. An interest-based approach was
the first choice of the respondents 75 percent of the time.
It was also shown that contracting personnel were less




VI . CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents conclusions based on the thesis
research and analysis. The principal and subsidiary
research recommendations will be discussed. Recommendations
for further research are also presented.
B . CONCLUSIONS
1. Four bargaining elements were considered important
by Government contracting specialists in situations similar
to the CONSTELLATION procurement scenario: (1) "Knowing what
you are buying," (2) "Your commitment to ensuring the
Government receives a fair and reasonable price," (3) "The
amount of time available to you to resolve the problem," and
(4) "Your understanding of the Government's interests."
These elements were identified and discussed in Chapters IV
and V.
2. There is no difference in the preference for the
four bargaining elements determined to be statistically
significant between inexperienced contracting personnel and
experienced contracting personnel.
3. The bargaining strategy and tactics that Government
contracting specialists used most frequently in the past to
bargain in cases such as the CONSTELLATION procurement
scenario were (1) "Explain that the seller's price is much
125
higher than what you expect the part should cost and ask for
a cost breakdown," (2) "Use probing questions (e.g., How did
the seller arrive at the price he is asking for the part.)
in order to test the firmness of the seller's position," and
(3) "Tell the seller that you need his help in order to
determine that the offered price is fair and reasonable."
These three strategies or tactics, along with, "Inform the
seller of possible alternatives to buying the part from the
seller" were strategy and tactics which Government
contracting personnel would prefer to use in the future.




Inexperienced contracting personnel were less
likely to have used the tactic, "Inform the seller of
possible alternatives to buying the part from the seller" in
the past than experienced personnel. However, for the
responses found to be statistically significant, there was
no difference between the preferences of inexperienced
contracting personnel and experienced contracting personnel
.
5. Government procurement specialists, when offered a
choice of bargaining approaches, prefer a principled, or
interest-based approach to bargaining, followed by a "soft
position" approach. A hard position approach is overall,




6. Experienced contracting personnel are less likely
to prefer an interest-based approach than inexperienced
contracting personnel.
C . RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Training for procurement and acquisition
professionals should include a Government-contractor
bilateral monopoly scenario similar to the CONSTELLATION
scenario
.
Contracting personnel should be aware of the bilateral
monopoly case and its relationship to sole source
procurement and acquisition. The bilateral monopoly case
provides a unique perspective for understanding the process
of bargaining and in particular, bargaining with a sole
source. It is important that Government contracting
personnel understand that bargaining advantage does not
always rest with the sole source supplier. Likewise,
Government contract specialists should also understand that
bargaining techniques can and should be used to ensure the
agreed upon purchase price is equitable.
2. The Federal Acquisition Regulation should be
revised to include a definition of the term "fair and
reasonable" as well as guidance for how to interpret and
apply the definition.
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While the Federal Acquisition Regulation suggests a
number of methods for determining what a fair and reasonable
price is, it does not define the term. The term is somewhat
amorphous and imprecise and certainly the criteria of
determination may vary somewhat from procurement to
procurement. However, a definition of "fair and reasonable"
along the lines of the definitions provided in the Contract
Pricing Reference Guide would almost certainly assist a
buyer when deciding price reasonableness. "Fair and
reasonable" plays a key role in Government procurement and
is too important not to be defined within the Federal
Acquisition Regulation.
D. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION:
What bargaining tactics and strategy might be effective
in purchasing goods or services from a sole source offeror
when the price is perceived as unfair or unreasonable?
The tactics or strategies preferred by Government
contracting personnel in situations similar to the
CONSTELLATION procurement scenario, a case where a sole
source offers the Government a price suspected to be unfair
or unreasonable are (1) "Explain that the seller's price is
much higher than what you expect the part should cost and
ask for a cost breakdown," (2) "Use probing questions (e.g.,
How did the seller arrive at the price he is asking for the
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part.) in order to test the firmness of the seller's
position," (3) "Tell the seller that you need his help in
order to determine that the offered price is fair and
reasonable," and (4) "Inform the seller of possible
alternatives to buying the part from the seller."
2. SUBSIDIARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS:
a) What is a "Fair and Reasonable" price?
"Fair and reasonable" lacks a concrete definition. The
Federal Acquisition Regulation lacks a definition for this
term. Thus, the term is open to some interpretation. The
word "fair" suggests an exchange which is equitable and
correct; "reasonable" may be interpreted as a descriptive
term for an act that reflects prudence and wisdom.
There are two principal methods for evaluating price
reasonableness: price analysis and cost analysis. In the
normal course of Government business, these methods are more
than adequate for evaluating what is and what is not a fair
and reasonable price. Adequate information however, is
essential for a buyer to successfully use either technique.
b) Are situations similar to the CONSTELLATION scenario
experienced by Government contracting personnel? Based on
survey results which showed over one-third of the
respondents had experienced this type of scenario, the
answer is yes.
c) Are there differences between experienced and
inexperienced contracting personnel with respect to the
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elements of bargaining they consider important in cases like
the CONSTELLATION scenario? No difference was observed
between the bargaining elements which experienced and
inexperienced contracting personnel thought were important.
d) Are there differences between experienced and
inexperienced contracting personnel with respect to the
bargaining strategy and tactics they would use if confronted
with a procurement situation like the one in the
CONSTELLATION? Inexperienced contracting personnel were
less familiar with the, "Inform the seller of possible
alternatives to buying the part from the seller" tactic than
experienced personnel . Experienced and inexperienced
personnel were equally likely to choose the following three
tactics (1) "Explain that the seller's price is much higher
than what you expect the part should cost and ask for a cost
breakdown," (2) "Use probing questions (e.g., How did the
seller arrive at the price he is asking for the part.) in
order to test the firmness of the seller's position," and
(3), "Tell the seller that you need his help in order to
determine that the offered price is fair and reasonable,"
e) What bargaining approaches are preferred by
Government procurement personnel? Government procurement
personnel overwhelmingly prefer an interest -based bargaining
approach
.
f) Is there any difference between the preferred
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bargaining approaches of experienced and inexperienced
contracting personnel? Experienced personnel are less
likely to prefer an interest-based approach than
inexperienced personnel.
g) How should a Government buyer prepare for bargaining
with a sole source, "Take It or Leave It" offeror? Based on
the elements of bargaining and the strategy and tactics
shown to have statistical significance, gathering and
assimilating information should be a Government buyer' s
first priority. This includes "Knowing what you are
buying," and "Your understanding of the Government's
interests". Also important to bargaining within this type
of scenario are actions that would bolster the Government's
"Commitment to ensuring a fair and reasonable price," and
actions that would extend the amount of "Time available" for
the procurement.
E. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
1. This research was tailored to one specific
procurement case, the case of a Government-contractor
bilateral monopoly. A number of bargaining elements were
found to be significant in this case including, knowledge or
information, commitment, time, interests and alternatives.
A follow-on study to this research which focused on the
role of one or more of these bargaining elements in other
bargaining or negotiation scenarios, such as negotiations
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for the acquisition of a major weapon system, might yield
significant results. Depending on the procurement or
acquisition scenario proposed, other elements of bargaining
might prove to be significant, or perhaps an entirely
different set of bargaining elements might prove to be
significant. Such knowledge would be of assistance to
Government contracting personnel preparing for the type of
bargaining or negotiation scenario studied.
2. The data within this thesis were collected through
the distribution of a survey. Siegel and Fouraker's
research is the only work found by the researcher which used
findings from empirical experimentation as a basis for
research. The procedures and scenarios used to conduct this
empirical work were detailed in Bargaining and Group
Decision Making, Experiments in Bilateral Monopoly . The
elements of bargaining determined to be significant within
this thesis could be examined empirically using Siegel and
Fouraker' s work as a basis and Government contracting
personnel as the subjects. A follow-on study using their
scenarios and Government contracting personnel as
participants might uncover additional conclusions which
might benefit the research within the contracting field and
the training of Government contracting personnel.
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The purpose of this survey is to identify effective
bargaining approaches which might be used to procure goods
or services from a sole source of supply when the sole
source refuses to bargain and the price is suspected to be
unfair or unreasonable. Initially, a sole source offeror
has considerable bargaining leverage over the Government.
Other factors may give a sole source even more bargaining
leverage. Pricing data needed to properly evaluate the
seller's quote may be incomplete, inaccurate or unavailable.
Urgent and compelling need may require accelerating the
procurement process. This survey has been designed to
gather and evaluate possible approaches a Government buyer
might use to effectively work through this type of difficult
procurement situation.
The information gathered from this survey will be
analyzed for information that Navy procurement personnel
may find helpful when dealing with a difficult sole source
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procurement. The goal is to increase the effectiveness of
Government procurement by proposing methods and strategies
which might be used by Government buyers to achieve a better
bargain from a sole source seller, and to ensure that the
price proposed by the sole source is fair and reasonable.
The survey is divided into five parts. Part I of the
survey requests various demographic information. Part II
presents a fictional procurement scenario which is used as a
basis for answering the survey questions in Part III. Part
IV of the survey provides a space for the reader to provide
additional bargaining strategy and approaches, commentary
and feedback. Part V presents different bargaining
approaches for the reader to evaluate.
Thank you for giving your valuable time to this survey
effort. Your knowledge, experience and acumen will be used
to form the nucleus for guidelines that all Government
contracting personnel may use to accomplish their work more
efficiently and make their jobs easier. When you have
completed the survey, please return it to your supervisor
for mailing.
Sincerely,
Dennis G. Van Veen
LT SC USN
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SURVEY PART I - DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
(Please circle or fill in the appropriate response.)
1. Name (optional) :
2. Age: 20-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50
55-60 61+
3. Gender: female male
4. Military rank or civilian pay grade:
5. Job title:
6. Command (optional) :
7. E-mail address (optional)
:
8. Years experience in Government contracting:
0-1 2-3 4-5 6-10 11-15 16-20
21-25 26+
9. Highest level of education attained:
a. Some High School e. Bachelor's Degree
b. High School Diploma f. Some Graduate Level
(or GED) Courses
c. Some College g. Master's Degree
d. Associate's Degree h. Doctorate Degree
10. Years experience you have had in each of the following
procurement categories. (Use fractions for partial years)
a. Under $2,500 d. $100 , 001-$5, 000 , 000
b. $2,501 - $25,000 e
. $5, 000 , 001-$10, 000, 000
c. $25,001 - $100,000 f. Over $10,000,000




You are a buyer for the Navy working at the Naval
Inventory Control Point (NAVICP) , Philadelphia. In front of
you is a purchase request from USS CONSTELLATION (CV 64) for
two high pressure steam reducing valves, parts which are
essential for the operation of two of the ship' s four steam-
powered catapults. The catapults are currently out of
commission due to lack of these two parts. The purchase
request is stamped C-3 CASREP, meaning that a major
degradation has occurred to a primary weapon system on board
a critical element of the Nation's defense. In fact, the
C-3 status of your requisition is automatic justification at
NAVICP for you to deviate from the normal requirements of
the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), based on the
"urgent and compelling" nature of the requirement. You
received the requisition yesterday and immediately called
the source of supply, San Diego Valve and Industrial (SDVI),
which quickly responded with an offer of $90,000 for the two
valves required.
The technical report was jusr. placed in your in-box.
The report says that the valves were manufactured according
to a design tailored to fit the unique pressure reducing
requirements of the steam catapults and that the original
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manufacturer went out of business 20 years ago. Eight of
the valves were originally procured by the Navy, four for
CONSTELLATION and four spares for supply system stock.
Supply stocks were exhausted 10 years ago when all four
valves were requisitioned for a major overhaul of the
catapults. The valve has not been purchased by the
Government since the original valves were purchased thirty
years ago. Purchase price for the original valves was
$1,500 each. The technical report stated that SDVI is the
only known source of the valves. The report also
concluded, based on an analysis of the NAVSHIPS drawings
for the valve, that manufacturing the valve, if a
manufacturer could be found, would take a minimum of 16
weeks
.
With some suspicion concerning the reasonableness of
the offered price, you called SDVI and requested cost or
pricing data that would allow you to justify the price.
SDVI refused to forward any cost or pricing data, telling
you that it is against their company policy to provide such
data. SDVI also reminded you that their price was below
$100,000, which is the Simplified Acquisition Threshold at
NAVICP. Finally, SDVI told you that their price is
"nonnegotiable . " In short, you were told to "Take it, or
leave it." CONSTELLATION is scheduled to depart on a six
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month deployment in three days . You have been told in no
uncertain terms that the ship must have these valves before
getting underway. The Commander of NAVICP, Admiral Flag,
will be briefed daily on the progress of this procurement.
Though the above scenario may seem highly unlikely, the
same or very similar situations do occur at the NAVICP and
the numerous field contracting offices which support the
U.S. Navy. The situation is this: There is only one known
supplier. Cost or pricing data cannot be obtained or is
inaccurate or incomplete. The part is urgently needed. The
supplier refuses to negotiate. What approaches should you,
as a Government buyer, use to ensure the Government receives
a fair and reasonable price?
Using the information contained in this scenario,




Please answer the following questions based on the USS
CONSTELLATION procurement scenario.
(circle your answer please)
1 . Have you ever had to buy goods and services under
conditions similar to the USS CONSTELLATION procurement
scenario?
a. Yes, once. d. Yes, several times.
b. No, never. e. Yes, at least one
occasion per month.
c. Yes, a couple f. Other.
of times.
2. Rank the following elements according to their
importance to resolving the bargaining impasse with San
Diego Valve and Industrial (SDVI) . (Rank your top ten
choices. Rank your most important element with a "1" and
your least important element with a "10".)
a. The seller's opinion of your credibility.
b. The relationship between you and the seller
from prior business dealings.
c. Your effectiveness as a communicator.
d. Possible alternatives to buying from the
seller
.




f. Your understanding of the seller's interests.
g. Successfully building a working relationship
between you and the seller.
h. Finding a middle ground or compromise between
you and the seller which provides for a mutual
gain
.
i. Convincing the seller to bargain objectively,
j. Successfully arguing that the seller's price
is unreasonable,
k. Knowing what you are buying.
1 . Your commitment to ensuring the Government
receives a fair and reasonable price,
m. The amount of time available to you to resolve
the problem,
n. The amount of effort you exert to resolve the
problem,
o. Other (Please explain)
3. In your own experience have you found that:
a. A "Take it or Leave It" offer from a sole source of
supply is always the final word.
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b. A "Take it or Leave It" offer from a sole source of
supply is almost always the final word.
c. A "Take it or Leave It" offer from a sole source of
supply is the final word over one half of the time.
4. In your own experience have you found that:
a. A "Take it or Leave It" offer from a sole source of
supply can occasionally be negotiated.
b. A "Take it or Leave It" offer from a sole
source of supply can usually be negotiated.
c. A "Take it or Leave It" offer from a sole
source of supply can almost always be negotiated.
5. Which strategies or approaches have you used in the
past, or would attempt to use in the future to resolve the
bargaining impasse with San Diego Valve and Industrial
(SDVI), assuming that it was not possible to find another





Have used in the
in the past future
a. Appeal to seller's patriotism.
b. Implicitly notify the seller that
future Government business for his
141
firm may be sharply curtailed unless
he bargains in good faith,
c. Tell the seller in no uncertain
terms that future Government business
for his firm may be sharply curtailed
unless he bargains in good faith.
d. Tell the seller that you need his
help in order to determine that
the offered price is fair and reasonable
e. Threaten to bypass the seller's
representative you are dealing with
and appeal for a fair and reasonable
price from his boss.
f. Use probing questions (e.g., How
did the seller arrive at the price
he is asking for the part.) in order
to test the firmness of the seller's
position
.
g. Inform the seller of possible
alternatives to buying the part from
the seller (e.g., possibly repairing
the valve)
.
h. Lie to the seller by informing him
that you have another source of
142
supply,
i. Tell the seller that you plan to
bring in higher management to
assist you.
j. Make a low ball counter-offer,
k. Make a counter-offer explaining
the amount offered is all you have.
1. Explain that the seller's price is
much higher than what you expect
the part should cost and ask for a
cost breakdown.
m. "Walk away" from the seller's offer,
with the hope that you can resume
bargaining on better terms later on
n. Offer the sole source a letter
contract
.
o. Tell the seller, "You have got
to do better than that!"
p. Tell the seller that a new design
for the part you wish to buy from
him is "In the works."
q. Tell the seller that his position
has angered your boss,
r. Patiently wait for the seller to
143
offer a better deal.
s. Other bargaining approaches you
would use or have used in the past
(Please describe, and use the reverse




1. Please use the space provided below to provide
additional information with respect to how you would resolve
the bargaining impasse with San Diego Valve and Industrial.




2. It may be beneficial to call you at some time in the
future to discuss your responses to this survey. May we
call you?
a. Yes. You may call me at telephone number
b. Please don't call me.
c. I prefer e-mail. My e-mail address is
3. Please use the space below to ask questions or provide
comments related to the survey. All questions will be
answered expeditiously. Any added comments (including
145
criticism) are appreciated.
Thank You. Please proceed to Part V.
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PART V - BARGAINING PREFERENCES
1. For each set of bargaining approaches listed below,
place a "1" next to your most preferred response, a "2" next
to your second preferred response and a "3" next to your
least preferred response:
a. Participate Participate as Participate as
friends adversaries problem-solvers
b. The goal is The goal is The goal is a




c. Separate Make concessions Demand
the people to cultivate the concessions as a
from the relationship condition of the
problem relationship
d. Be hard on Be soft on the Be soft on the
the people people and soft people and hard
and hard on the problem on the problem
problem
e. Trust others Distrust others Proceed
independent
of trust




















































Try to avoid Try to reach a













Thank You! You have now completed this survey. Please
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